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Executive Summary 
Executive Summary 
Middlesex University and Belmana Consulting were commissioned by the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to study the value of jobs and skills in the 
defence sector, and their role in driving the productivity of the sector. The defence sector here 
is defined in terms of those companies involved in the design and manufacture of defence 
equipment and the research and development associated with this. BEIS commissioned this 
project to refresh, and develop further, the evidence base to support the government in 
assessing the costs and benefits of investment decisions in defence. 
The research compiled a list of defence businesses. It then identified the jobs in the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings where the employer was one of the defence businesses. The 
survey covers around 120,000 full-time jobs, of which just under a thousand are in defence 
businesses. The data about these defence jobs was analysed using a variety of approaches, 
which together present a picture of the value of jobs and skills in the defence sector. A wage 
premium is observed in the jobs in defence firms, which remains even when the calculation of 
the premium is in relation to “comparable” non-defence jobs. 
A wage premium can be a proxy for high labour productivity, rewarding the added value of an 
employee in the defence sector who, in another job, would have contributed less to output. 
This may reflect the sector’s innovativeness, or its ability to capture markets abroad, or its 
operating scale. It may reflect also the distinctive nature of working in defence, such as the 
security clearance that individuals require to work in the sector. Work in defence is also often 
procured from a single source, procured without open competition to meet specific defence 
needs. This sometimes occurs in conditions of urgency, especially at times of military 
operations. A concern is also then that the defence premium may reflect a lack of competitive 
pressures in these circumstances. 
The research primarily estimates the defence premium and the driver of premiums by 
analysing the defence jobs in ASHE in relation to all other jobs. The research carefully 
assesses whether the jobs are paid at a certain level because of the skills, experience, location 
and individual/company characteristics or because of something specific to defence, the 
“defence premium”. The results are corroborated by analysing the data in different ways. 
Additional work is presented comparing the defence jobs with a sample of matched non-
defence jobs in ASHE that have similar characteristics. A second analysis focuses on the 
(relatively small) number of individuals who switch jobs into or out of defence to see if there is 
any pay change associated with switching. 
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Trends in Defence Wages and the Wage Premium 
BEIS research questions focused on how sector wages in defence compare to the 
average UK full-time wage and the average for the manufacturing sector. What has been 
the trend over the last 10 years? What is the ‘wage premium’ that the sector attracts? Do 
wages reflect skills and capabilities that businesses require in the sector? 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) was 
analysed in different ways to answer these research questions. ASHE is a survey of employers 
which tracks the same 1% of individuals, collecting data each year about the jobs they hold. 
• Figure 1 plots out the annual median gross pay in three sectors for 2004-14. It uses 
published ASHE statistics. The “wider defence” measure covers the industries where 
businesses typically supply UK defence needs, often alongside civilian uses (hence a 
“wider” definition). Wages paid in the defence industries have consistently been about 20-
25% higher than both manufacturing and the All economy measures. The wage gap in 
pounds can be £10,000. 
• Figure 1 indicates the wage premium is persistent over the decade. Only in a brief period 
after the recession is there any evidence of the wage premium reducing. 
Figure 1: Gross Annual Pay for Full-time Employees (£ pa), 2004-14 
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Wider Defence is a weighted average across industry medians: Automotive (SIC 291), Aerospace (303), 
Shipbuilding (301), Military Fighting Vehicles (304) and Manufacture of weapons and ammunition (254).  
SIC 291, 301 and 303 will include employees working in businesses largely focused on civilian and military. 
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• Figure 2 separates the premium seen in 2012-14 from that observed in 2004-2011 using 
the published ASHE data. It also separates the wider definition of defence into the 
constituent industries. A large part of the driver for the premium rising in money terms is 
the general wage increases seen in manufacturing acting on an existing wage premium. 
• The gap between wages paid in manufacturing and pay in the automotive, ship building 
and aerospace industries has increased the most. The sample size in ASHE for the 
weapons and military vehicles industry is quite small, but the premium has declined here. 
Figure 2: Wage premium by industrial sector for full time employees 
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Wider Defence is a weighted average across industry medians: Automotive (SIC 291), Aerospace (303), 
Shipbuilding (301), Military Fighting Vehicles (304) and Manufacture of weapons and ammunition (254). 
SIC 291, 301 and 303 will include employees working in businesses largely focused on civilian and military. 
Source is calculations from published ASHE, annual, median, full-time pay estimates by SIC. 
Executive Summary 
One novelty of this study is that it identifies defence employers and so the jobs in the ASHE 
survey that are in defence businesses. For 2012-14, this meant identifying under 1,000 full-
time jobs as defence. This is about 0.7% of all full-time jobs covered by ASHE. The main 
results about these jobs are: 
• The jobs in the defence businesses have a weekly average gross pay of £700, about 
£118 greater than all jobs in ASHE in 2012 or a premium of 20%.  
• A simple comparison of pay in defence jobs to all jobs could reflect defence requiring 
higher skilled or experienced employees. The wage premium is estimated to be lower, at 
5-12%, when it is calculated in relation to jobs requiring comparable skills and 
experience. 
• The repeated surveying of the same individuals in ASHE means that individuals who 
change jobs can be identified. Those entering defence businesses received a pay rise 
5% greater than those moving out of defence businesses. This is an alternative measure 
of the wage premium. The method does not need to adjust for people’s skills and 
experience, as it same people switching into or out of defence jobs so that the pay 
change is on average only due to the change of sector. 
The research considers how defence jobs differ from the wider set of jobs: 
• The defence jobholder tends to be older, on average aged 43 while the wider full-time 
workforce is 41 years’ old. An older workforce is likely to be more experienced. 
• Defence jobs tend to be filled by men with 17.5% of jobholders being women; of all full-
time jobs, 39% are held by women. 
• Defence jobs are in establishments that are more capital intensive than other jobs; the 
jobs are also in manufacturing with only a third of the jobs being outside the sector. 
• There are few defence jobs located in London, but there is a relatively high concentration 
in the Southeast. Much of the research focuses on pay levels and so this geography is 
important. London’s wage premium is high and its impact spreads into the Southeast, so 
that the defence jobs in the southeast will attract some wage premium due to location. 
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Driver of Defence Wages and Wage Premiums 
A second set of research questions focused on drivers of wages in defence. Specifically, 
BEIS research questions were: what are the skills levels, relative to the rest of the UK 
and the manufacturing sector? Is there any significant spatial variation and does this 
matter? Is there any variation by business type or type of investment/product in the 
sector?  
In ASHE, employers are asked about the occupation of each job. This has been linked to 
evidence from two surveys about the skills and experience associated with occupations and 
whether employers experience a shortage for the occupation. O*NET, a US survey, asks 
employers to score the occupations of their employees in terms of several dimensions of 
competency. The UK Employer Skills Survey asks employers about the shortages they face as 
they recruit:  
• For the jobs in defence businesses, the most common occupation is Science, Research, 
Engineering and Technology Professionals. The 169 such jobs in defence businesses 
represent 3.1% of all the jobs in this occupation found in ASHE.  
• More generally, the occupations associated with defence jobs are engineering related, 
often requiring high levels of skills, experience and knowledge.  
Figure 3: Defence wages versus all full-time jobs: Contribution to premium (%) 
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• Figure 3 focuses on what drives defence jobs being highly paid, compared to all UK jobs. 
On the left is the wage premium noted above: defence jobs are paid about a quarter more 
than all other jobs. 
• The occupations in defence consistently have higher skills/experience scores. It is 
estimated to increase defence earnings by 9-12%, using the ASHE results 2012-14. 
• The defence jobs tend to be in the manufacturing sector and this is generally a better 
paid sector. This contributes about 2%. 
Executive Summary 
• The location of the jobs has an effect, but this operates in both a positive and a negative 
way. While many defence jobs are in the Southeast, which attracts a premium, this is 
outweighed by the fact that few defence jobs are in London, with London attracting a very 
high wage premium. 
There is a wage premium of about 8-15% that remains after the pay in defence jobs is adjusted 
for the mix of skills, employee characteristics and employer/plant attributes of the jobs. There is 
an additional premium for the subset of defence jobs that are in clusters associated with the 
aviation sub-sector, primarily working on Combat Air systems. When defence jobs are 
compared to jobs outside defence but comparable in terms of these characteristics, Figure 4 
indicates the drivers of the remaining premium: 
• A portion of the defence premium is explained by businesses in the sector hiring shortage 
occupations. In general, across all sectors, where employers identify a shortage 
occupation, this correlates with a higher wage. However, in defence jobs this effect is 
enhanced, contributing about 4% of the defence premium over comparable non-defence 
jobs. 
• The jobs in defence primes – these businesses lead large contracts for the Ministry of 
Defence –  contribute about one per cent to the premium. Primes may benefit more from 
the single source procurement used in defence than other defence businesses, usually in 
a supply chain or in a market where competitive pressures are greater.The 2012 results 
indicate the importance of identifying apprentices, as the apprentice marker only occurs 
in the 2013 and 2014 waves of ASHE. Without this marker, the lower pay of apprentices 
is allocated to age (positively as apprentices are young) and makes the other drivers 
inaccurate, especially the skills premium. 
Figure 4: Defence premium drivers comparing with similar non-defence jobs (%) 
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Leaving and Joining the Defence Sector 
A final set of research question focused on what do individuals go on to do when they 
leave the defence sector, particularly engineers and the armed forces. How do their 
wages compare? 
The repeated surveying of the same individuals in ASHE means that the people who change 
jobs can be identified. This can be used to measure the premium indirectly, as pay changes for 
an individual as s/he move between industries: 
• Those entering defence businesses received a pay rise of 4.8% greater than those 
moving from defence businesses. Despite a relatively small sample size, this proves to be 
a statistically significant difference. 
• Employees that stay in defence see an average annual pay rise of 3.5%. The pay of 
those that move from a defence job to one outside the defence sector rises 5.4%, higher 
but not statistically different from the rises seen in those that remained in defence jobs. 
• ASHE – like most public surveys – does not sample the serving Armed Forces. It 
therefore remained beyond the scope of this study to look at the wage premium attached 
to military veterans. 
Table 1: Evidence of annual pay changes for those switching from and to defence jobs, 2009-14 
Pay change as individuals…     
…Take up jobs in defence businesses +10.2%  
…Leave jobs in defence businesses +5.4% 
…Stay in defence jobs +3.5% 
10 
Note: Increase in hourly wage rate for full-time employees in defence jobs plus those exiting defence. 
Significance tests for whether pay increases for movers different from stayers and secondly whether the 
rise for those entering jobs in defence significantly higher than those leaving defence businesses.  
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
1. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
The government’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR), published in November 2015, introduced “Promoting our Prosperity” as a 
national security objective. This included commitments to refresh defence industrial policy as 
one of several measures to help the UK’s defence industry grow and compete successfully, to 
drive greater innovation in defence procurement and to ensure that future investment decisions 
contribute to a more dynamic and productive economy.  
To support this work BEIS identified a need to better understand the contribution that the 
defence sector currently makes to the UK economy. BEIS commissioned this project to 
refresh, and develop further, the evidence base to support the government in assessing the 
costs and benefits of investment decisions in defence. The project could also support work to 
develop a methodology for assessing value for money in defence investment decisions (e.g. 
covering trade-offs between capability, cost and exportability).  
The aim of this study is to better understand the value of jobs and skills in the Defence sector, 
and their role in driving the productivity of the sector. There are different definitions of what 
constitutes the defence sector. A wide definition covers the breadth of Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) procurement. Such definitions support analysis of defence spending, but – because of 
the nature of defence – extends the analysis into sectors that may not focus on defence and 
security related products or do not see defence as the core activity.  
The defence sector here is defined in terms of those companies involved in the design and 
manufacture of defence equipment and the research and development associated with this. 
This narrower definition allows analysis to concentrate on how defence activity contributes to 
productivity, especially in its use of labour and the associated skills development, investment 
and R&D for defence. 
The main research questions for the study are as follows:  
1. How do sector wages compare to the average UK FTE wage and the average for the 
manufacturing sector? What has been the trend over the last 10 years? What is the 
‘wage premium’ that the sector attracts?   
2. Do wages reflect skills and capabilities that businesses require in the sector? Specifically, 
what skills levels on average do those employed in the sector hold, relative to the rest of 
the UK and the manufacturing sector, and what is the correlation with wage levels? 
3. Is there any significant spatial variation? Does spatial employment in the sector matter? 
4. Is there any variation by type of business (large, small, Prime, Tier 1/2)? 
5. Is there any variation by type of investment/product in the sector? 
6. What do individuals go on to do when they leave the defence sector, particularly 
engineers and the armed forces? How do their wages compare? 
For this study, two key tasks were undertaken. First, a dataset of jobs in defence and, for 
comparison purposes, jobs outside defence was constructed. This contained the pay rate with 
the detail of the skills, age and gender of the employee as well as the size, location and firm 
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level characteristics of the employer. The second stage then uses this dataset to answer the 
research questions. A focus has been to understand the extent of any wage premium, defined 
as the difference between average wages in defence and a set of comparable jobs outside of 
defence. 
The sectoral performance of the wages in defence sector are explored using ASHE in chapter 
5. The study considers this performance in terms of key drivers for wages, such as skills, 
location and characteristics of the business (size and capital investment). The approach has 
then been to decompose the wage rates in terms of what portion of the wage is a defence 
premium understanding the drivers for this. 
From a policy perspective, there has been an interest in two key areas. A first is what is 
happening in the labour market associated with Combat Air, large-scale naval procurements 
and with the parts of defence that necessitate nuclear-related skills and investments. Where 
possible, the study distinguishes results for the aviation centres, which largely produce or 
support Combat Air equipment, and the naval centres. This has been possible by 
distinguishing in the data the jobs that are in the clusters. This was not possible for the nuclear 
related jobs as there were too few in the dataset used in this study. 
A second area of policy interest is the labour market in relation to the different tiers in defence 
procurement. The primes and tier 1 contractors are typically large, global defence businesses 
that lead major defence projects. As they are large employers, it was possible to mark in the 
data the jobs associated with these businesses and consider what effect there is from being in 
a prime on wages. 
ASHE is a longitudinal panel, tracking individuals each year as they change jobs. It was 
therefore possible to understand what happens as individuals leave defence businesses and 
enter these businesses from outside the sector. The evidence on the number of people 
switching between sectors was somewhat limited by there being relatively few people changing 
jobs each year in the sample of defence jobs. Further, serving members of the Armed Forces 
are not included in ASHE and so little could be said about their transition from the military into 
civilian roles both inside and outside the defence sector.
12 
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2. Context and Key Findings 
This chapter presents the context for the research and the key findings of the study. It 
describes the role played by the defence sector, particularly the suppliers of defence 
equipment and equipment support and the supply chain that underpins these 
businesses. It has benefited from discussion with experts that were interviewed during 
the research. The chapter summarises the evidence that the study finds about where 
defence jobs are located and the wage premium enjoyed by the employees of defence 
businesses. 
The Defence Industry in the UK 
Defence plays a special role in the UK economy for several reasons. It is a strong contributor 
to the manufacturing base, employing directly more than 140,000 people and providing places 
for 4,300 apprentices. It is an important export sector, with exports averaging £7.7 billion in 
2010-14 (ADS, 2016). Moreover, it is strategically important for national security (HMG & DGP, 
2014).  
The defence industry’s structure is shaped by its role supplying the UK’s military capability. 
Competition is the starting point for the government in procurement, but single source 
contracting remains a prominent feature in the UK defence acquisition landscape. This is 
where the supply of a good or service is from one supplier because of its specialised or unique 
characteristic. There are military-strategic benefits of non-competitive contracting. It is 
associated with greater independence from other countries’ procurement, sometimes 
conferring a defensive edge. Also, it offers greater security of future supply and the potential 
for equipment to be designed with the UK requirements as a focus. However, there are 
concerns that the reduced competitive pressure has a negative dimension. With a single 
purchaser and – in many instances – monopolistic supply, the reduced competition pressures 
might lead to a defence cost premium, and this is then translating into a wage premium for 
those working in defence. 
Much of this study focuses on quantitative analysis of the drivers for any defence wage 
premium. However, the study has also benefited from discussions with experts from the 
Ministry of Defence, the industry body ADS Group, the Single-Source Regulations Authority, 
HM government’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority and two leading defence businesses. 
The discussions were primarily around the drivers for defence pay, especially where this 
differed from other parts of the economy. It provided an important context to the study and this 
section includes the observations made. 
Research has suggested that the UK’s onshore defence industry provides a range of economic 
and employment benefits to the UK. Dorman et al (2015) noted that the sector is high-
technology and high-value, finding that over half of the employees in UK defence companies 
are involved in R&D (22 per cent), or engineering and production and assembly (31 per cent). 
Defence sector experts highlighted some specific ways this impacts pay.  
The interviewees for this study, firstly, noted that the high skills required in defence command a 
higher wage and that the qualifications of employees were at a high level. Secondly, defence 
businesses highlighted their investment in skills development, often in an environment where 
there was considerable competition for the individuals that benefited from the investments. A 
point made by interviewees was that defence products are tournament goods (described in 
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Davies et al., 2012), in that their use is in the adversarial battle environment. Defence will 
require battle-winning technologies and to produce winners, this tournament then drives the 
UK’s defence industry paying a premium. 
The defence industry forms a hub for generating science, technology and skills within the 
national workforce. For this reason, the government formed the “Defence Growth Partnership” 
with industry leaders in 2014, publishing an implementation plan in that year (HMG & DGP, 
2014). One aspect of the partnership will be focus on skill development and utilisation. It will 
foster collaboration between industry, research and academia, as well as providing 
apprenticeships to attract more graduates into the industry. Interviewees noted that, like many 
other high-tech sectors, the defence industry suffers from a looming skills shortage as older 
engineers retire. There have also been questions about the talent pipeline, with calls for 
strategies to ensure there are enough students enrolled in the relevant subjects being 
complemented by pay incentives to retain experienced, older staff for longer (Retter et al., 
2015). 
Government bodies interviewed for this study have been considering these issues at a 
strategic level, seeking to understand the talent pipeline in the context of the programme of UK 
major projects envisaged in the coming decades. There are several very large defence 
programmes, such as the Successor and the Queen Elizabeth class carriers and associated 
investments. These projects would run in parallel with major UK energy and transport projects. 
A premium may emerge in defence pay signalling the competition for key engineering skills as 
demand rises. Discussions then considered the analysis needed to ensure such signals 
translate into supply of trained and skilled engineers improving in the defence sector. 
Wage premiums in defence should be analysed in the context of several factors specific to 
defence. Firstly, defence production is clustered in certain areas, usually associated with 
important production infrastructure. For example, defence investments related to the 
submarine fleet are in Cumbria with associated employment. The supply chain for this cluster 
then extends to other areas, but a wage premium should be analysed recognising a job market 
may have locational specificity. Industry experts viewed the very localised nature of defence 
jobs as core to their human resource functions. They reported the extensive information 
gathering at a local level about labour market conditions, the collaboration with higher 
education bodies in training and the tie-in with local enterprise partnerships and strategic 
suppliers as a key complement to pay setting. It was also noted that a pay premium may be a 
consequence of this high level of skills building occurring in relatively segmented, local labour 
markets. 
A further complication is that defence procurement routinely is under single-source 
procurement regulations. Where defence needs can only be met by a single supplier, 
procurement is then managed recognising that competitive pressures on costs – including pay 
of staff – will be limited. MOD writes into contracts many cost control and cost recovery clauses 
to compensate for this. These have recently been given more significance with the refreshing 
of the regulatory framework overseeing such contracts following the Currie Review (2012). The 
issue this highlights is that the wage-setting arrangements for defence jobs should be seen in 
the wider context of defence procurement. 
Discussions highlighted the pay drivers due to this procurement route. The UK has had over a 
decade of active military operations and there has been a strong, on-going demand for military 
equipment. This has often been met through Urgent Operational Requirements, a fast-track for 
MOD to procure from single sources for operations. The urgency has implied costs and these 
are likely to manifest themselves in a wage premium as staff have met the increased and 
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urgent demands. Further, as operations have lessened, there is a need to understand whether 
the urgency driver has reduced to the extent of reversing the cost pressures. 
Several discussions centred around the supply chain and whether any defence premium was 
conferred to employees of businesses outside the so-called “defence primes”. Primes are the 
lead suppliers in major equipment programmes, usually leading a consortium of tier 1 main 
suppliers and then sub-contracting to the wider defence supply chain. It is possible that 
procurement through a single source arrangement meant there was a wage premium in the 
lead contractor, usually a large defence prime. As the lead contractor then competes the works 
to lower tiers, the competitive pressure might be greater in the supply chain and so lessening 
the extent of any wage premium there. 
These features of the defence sector could translate into an observable phenomenon: that a 
job in defence that is like one outside defence could be more highly paid. On the face of it, this 
would reflect either a failure in measurement (in that the job holders differ in some unmeasured 
way that explains the pay gap); or some market characteristic, or even lack of competitive 
pressure.  
However, it may also reflect a productivity premium, with the job using the skills and expertise 
of the jobholder more effectively in creating value. In discussions with defence businesses, a 
typical example was employers’ recruitment at entry level. This targeted those that had some 
work experience, especially where that experience involved handling machinery. So, in 
agricultural areas, young people who had worked with farm machinery were switching industry. 
The switch would then lead to a better paid career, such as in maintenance of military 
equipment. The productivity-enhancement this causes has led to an interest in any wage 
premium that may exist, especially if it is accurately measured by taking account of the job 
holders’ skills and experience. 
Key Empirical Findings 
This study finds evidence of a wage premium for jobs in defence which is persistent 
over time: a job in the defence sector will attract a wage premium of between 5% to 12% 
wages over a similar job outside of the defence sector. 
An important contribution to the difference in pay between defence jobs and non-defence jobs 
is the shortages in certain occupations. There is also some evidence that those employed in 
the defence primes, businesses that are directly contracted by the Ministry of Defence for large 
programmes, attract a pay premium. The analysis also looks at factors that cause defence 
wages to be high relative to the average UK job, confirming that this is largely due to the skills 
and expertise required in defence jobs. 
The average pay of employees is reported annually by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
when it publishes the results of its Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). Over the 
past decade, this has indicated an annual gross pay premium for those parts of the 
manufacturing sector most closely linked to defence. The estimates cover the jobs in the 
Automotive, Aerospace and Shipbuilding, combining both civil and military use, and then add 
the jobs in the two military focused industries: Military Fighting Vehicles and Manufacture of 
Weapons and Ammunition. The pay in these jobs has consistently been higher than the pay in 
jobs found in manufacturing and the “all economy” category, by at least ten per cent and often 
being over 20%. 
A concern in attributing this to defence is that many of the industries comprise a significant 
non-defence portion. Further, there are businesses supplying defence outside the industries 
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identified. Both may mean some imprecision in the estimates of any wage premium. Therefore, 
this study uses public lists of businesses with a strong defence focus identifying 1,335 
companies. Of these, 1,155 were matched to a Companies House number and most of these 
were then linked to the ONS business register. In each of the years 2012-14, around 900 
employees in these businesses were in the ASHE sample. 
Attribution of a wage premium to a type of employer has several difficulties, primarily because 
it is inevitable that some aspect of a job remains unmeasured and that this may explain any 
wage difference. A statistically powerful way to control for this is to focus on those individuals 
that switch in and out of defence jobs. This neatly sidesteps many of the measurement issues. 
By observing the same person in a defence and non-defence job, any pay change can be 
attributed to the transition between sectors. 
ASHE is a panel; in that it observes the same people each year tracking individuals through 
different spells of employment. Table 2.1 summarises the pay changes seen in the subsample 
of people who move into defence jobs from outside defence and those that move the other 
way. It also looks at those that stay in defence. It presents the most powerful evidence of a pay 
premium in defence, indicating that those entering jobs in defence business received pay rise 
of 4.8 per cent greater than those moving out of those businesses. This difference is significant 
at 5 percent confidence.  
Table 2.1 indicates also that – while those staying in defence get an annual pay increase of 
3.5% - those moving into defence jobs see a 10% pay increase. This is significant (at 1%). 
Those moving the other way, to jobs outside of defence, only see a 5.4% pay rise, which is not 
statistically different to the annual pay increase in defence jobs. 
Table 2.1: Evidence of annual pay changes for those switching from and to defence jobs, 2009-14 
Pay change as individuals…    
…Take up jobs in defence businesses +10.22% Greater than stayer*** Difference is +4.79% 
…Leave jobs in defence businesses +5.43% No different to stayer Difference is +4.79% 
…Stay in defence jobs +3.49% Stayer pay increase F(1,3693) = 4.9, significant at 5% 
Note: Increase in hourly wage rate for full-time employees in defence jobs plus those exiting defence. 
Significance tests for whether pay increases for movers different from stayers and secondly whether the 
rise for those entering jobs in defence significantly higher than those leaving defence businesses.  
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The skills, experience and geography of defence jobs means that comparing average gross 
pay of defence jobs with the wider ASHE sample is an inaccurate estimate of any premium. 
The 832 defence jobs in 2012 are likely to involve individuals that differ from the wider ASHE 
sample. Potentially, the entire pay difference could reflect not the fact that the employers are 
involved in defence but just that defence tends to have jobs requiring higher skilled or 
experienced employees. Were these individuals to move out of the defence sector, it may be 
that the individuals would find, on average, higher paid jobs.
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Table 2.2: Decomposition of the Wage Premium 
Type of premium 2012 2013 2014 
Defence-specific wage premium    
Defence other drivers 3.7% 2.7% 4.5% 
Occupations considered shortage 6.0% 3.1% 4.0% 
Businesses are primes 0.0% 1.5% 1.3% 
Skills premium -4.8% -1.3% -0.2% 
Gender premium -1.1% -0.5% -1.0% 
Age-related 4.1% 2.5% -1.3% 
TOTAL 7.9% 8.1% 7.3% 
Premium due to defence job’s attributes differing from UK jobs    
Skills premium for defence 9.7% 10.9% 11.9% 
Manufacturing premium 3.2% 2.7% 2.9% 
Jobs based in the Southeast 1.1% 0.5% 0.6% 
Jobs based in London -3.3% -2.9% -3.0% 
Detail about skills premium associated with defence jobs    
Monitoring processes, materials and surroundings and selling and 
influencing 6.9% 7.2% 7.6% 
Problem solving, negotiating, control, planning & prioritising 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 
Materials, Equipment & Technical 4.3% 4.3% 4.6% 
Handling, inspecting objects, machines and vehicles, coordinating 
people -2.7% -2.8% -2.5% 
 
The top panel of table 2.2 indicates the results carefully controlling for this. It gives the 
premium for defence jobs over comparable jobs and then attributes the premium to the 
interaction of being a defence business and the different aspects of the job. This study finds 
two drivers/components of this wage premium are skills shortage and a defence employer 
being a prime. Where employers identify a shortage occupation, this correlates with a wage 
premium. However, in defence jobs this effect is enhanced, contributing about 4 per cent of the 
overall 7-8% premium in the table. Another feature identified in the table is that the defence 
firms identified as primes – these businesses lead large contracts for the Ministry of Defence – 
pay employees more than they otherwise would receive, given the skills, location age etc. 
associated with the role. This contributes 1% to the premium. 
The wage premium seeks to compare a job in defence with one that is similar, but outside 
defence. The lower panel in table 2.2 indicates why this is important. Defence jobs are highly 
paid, compared to all UK jobs. In ASHE 2012, for the 832 jobs identified as defence jobs, 
weekly gross pay was £700, about £118 greater than all jobs in ASHE. Table 2.2 indicates that 
the jobs tend to be in the manufacturing sector and this is generally a better paid sector. The 
table indicates the location of the jobs has an effect but this operates in a positive and a 
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negative way. While many defence jobs are in the Southeast, the premium of working in the 
region is outweighed by the fact that few defence jobs are in London, with London attracting a 
very high wage premium.  
However, the table highlights the main reason for defence jobs being paid well in comparison 
with the wider set of UK jobs. Generally, the skills and experience of the jobs in defence is 
higher than those outside the sector: the occupations in defence consistently have higher 
skills/experience scores and these are estimated to increase defence earnings by 9-12%, 
using the ASHE results 2012-14.  
The report details the mix of skills and knowledge associated with jobs in defence, estimating 
its effect on pay levels. Table 2.2 suggests that a set of skills differentiate the defence jobs 
from the wider set of jobs. The occupations are associated with skills and knowledge that are 
focused on equipment production, including problem solving and process management skills. 
This correlates with the occupational breakdown found in this study. Defence jobs are more 
likely to be in occupations “Science, Research Engineering and technical Professionals”, 
“Science, Research Engineering and technical Associates”, “Skilled Metal, Electrical and 
Electronic Trades” and “Process, Plant and Machine Operatives” than the wider ASHE sample. 
Defining and Estimating Wage Premiums 
A wage premium is the amount by which some workers earn more than others, although they 
supposedly do the same work, have the same qualifications, or are similar in some other 
relevant way. The literature on wage premiums originates with research on the returns to 
education, establishing the value of an extra year of schooling or higher education. However, 
there has also been research on other kinds of premiums, for example the public-sector 
premium (e.g. IDS, 2013).  
There may be an economic rationale for wage premiums in the defence sector: the defence 
industry can capture economic rents, partly because many of the firms are specialists in their 
fields, customising products to the needs of the UK Ministry of Defence. Efficiency wages could 
also play a role in wage setting in the defence sector. As firms are highly specialised, workers 
acquire sector-specific skills, that can also be valuable in adjacent sectors, such as related civil 
sectors. To reduce turnover and reduce the loss of intellectual property, firms may choose to 
pay higher wages. Lastly, there could also be undesirable aspects related to the defence 
sector that workers would want to be compensated for. This could include, for example, the 
need for security clearance or the costs associated with the confidentiality of the work.  
What makes the discussion of a premium complicated is that it is hard to define what 
constitutes a “premium”. If a worker with a higher qualification or greater experience than 
his/her colleague performs better, the price of the labour should be higher. However, if they 
perform the same work and produce the same value, but one gets paid more because of 
his/her degree, this could constitute a premium. Similarly, it has been argued that workers in 
the public sector get paid more than their counterparts who do similar work in the private 
sector.  
The concept of a “counterpart” poses another problem. Observing two workers at an assembly 
line in the same plant makes it easy to establish that they perform the same work with the 
same output. However, in a world with a lot of different occupations, it is much harder to 
compare like with like. When comparing wages, it is also important to consider wage 
structures. In some industries and occupations, bonuses, overtime pay and other perks such 
as health insurance and pension contributions are common, while they do not exist in others. 
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These should ideally be considered in a fair comparison of wages, but data may not be 
available, especially as pay rates remain a sensitive issue. 
Wage premiums are also likely to change over time as supply and demand of certain skills in 
the economy change. For example, Kleibrink and Michaelsen (2011) show that in the UK, the 
higher education premium has decreased over time, especially for lower quality degrees and 
bachelor degrees compared to masters or PhD degrees.  
It is much harder to control for differences in skills and experience. For the public-sector wage 
premium, IDS (2013) find that after controlling for education, experience and responsibility, an 
apparent difference between public and private sector wages disappears. However, even 
variables such as years of education and qualifications capture only a fraction of the 
requirements of a certain employee in a certain position. Information about role-specific 
experience, for example, is almost impossible to capture.  
A combination of carefully defining possible roles and then linking to each role the skills and 
experience it requires has been one way in which the complexity of making different jobs 
comparable. In the US, surveys have been conducted to establish how comparable different 
jobs are by asking employers about the main jobs in their businesses. In the UK, the Employer 
Skills Survey provides information from the employer perspective on this, as it asks employers 
about the reasons behind vacancies that prove hard to fill. Therefore, it shows to what degree 
certain skills are in especially short supply.  
The existence of a pay premium for the defence sector in the UK has important implications. 
On the one hand, a wage premium could be an indicator of a skills shortage that should be 
addressed quickly to enable the industry to grow and meet future demand. On the other hand, 
spreading knowledge of this premium should make the sector attractive. If the premium can be 
explained by special skills and experience present in the workforce of the defence industry, this 
fact can also be used to shape skills policy.  
For policy making, wider impacts of investment are considered, especially as government 
expenditures support jobs in specific sectors and areas of the country. Under certain 
circumstances, the evidence for a wage premium can support public policy decisions. This 
study provides a more detailed understanding of the value of jobs and skills in the defence 
sector, contributing to the debate about their role in driving productivity in that sector.  
As noted above, any premium estimate is only high quality if the matching of jobs in the 
defence sector is accurate. This presents three challenges. A first is defining the defence 
sector meaningfully. Defence procurement is often a starting point, but much of what defence 
procures is not purely “defence”, such as the procurement of back office functions. Further, the 
defence sector extends beyond the prime contractor, with a long and complex supply chain. In 
chapter 4, the approach to meet this challenge is described. Lists of businesses involved with 
MOD procurement are combined with lists of firms that describe themselves as defence-
focused. A range of tests have then been developed to refine the combined list of businesses. 
However, the key role of this work was to be able to link the businesses – using the 
Companies House and ONS business identifier – to an annual ONS survey about UK jobs. 
The second challenge is about what characteristics to use to match across jobs, developing a 
wider dataset with the relevant variables. Matching will usually start with occupation, identified 
by the standard occupation classification (SOC) code. A difficulty of this approach is that 
occupations are very diverse. Even those that appear comparable on the 4- or 5-digit SOC 
code level can entail different skills and tasks across different sectors (IDS, 2013). Therefore, 
rather than relying only on occupation, researchers have started to consider education, 
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experience and responsibilities. Chapter 5 explains how this study uses employer surveys to 
characterise the different occupations in terms of the skills and competencies needed. There 
are several surveys that ask businesses about the jobs of their workforce, and these can be 
linked to the occupation codes for jobs.  
The third challenge is the technical aspects of determining which jobs should be compared to 
those in defence to estimate any premium. Once variables about jobs have been compiled and 
the wage rates calculated in a comparable way, selecting the jobs that are like those in 
defence in all aspects except the sector requires selecting a matching method and then 
ensuring its robustness. In this study, different approaches have been used.  
A first looks at the small sample of individuals who switch in and out of the defence sector. The 
fact that the individuals move means that looking at any change in wage level neatly avoids 
having to control for the characteristics of the person. It allows the analysis to focus on the 
wage impact of moving between sectors. However, the more detailed analysis needs larger 
samples and job switchers are relatively rare. So, the study uses wage equations. These 
statistically model the wage rate in terms of the characteristics of the employee, the employer 
and the attributes of the job. The results are in chapter 5.
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3. Identifying Defence Businesses 
Past studies about the jobs in defence related businesses have relied on published 
statistics. The studies first identify which industries in the standard industrial 
classification (SIC) have a significant defence component and then estimate key 
statistics, such as employment and wage rates, across these industries. However, 
standard classifications have limitations, a main one being that many industries are 
defined in a manner that does not reveal the user of their products. 
This study created a list of defence firms based on sources that identify individual firms that are 
supplying defence products or marketing to defence purchasers. The list is then linked to 
business registers and firm-level data. This allows analysis of the jobs associated with defence 
at a detailed level. 
The study uses a four-stage method to identify firms in the defence sector. The four stages 
are: 
• Merge lists of businesses potentially in the defence sector removing duplicates; 
• Link to the Companies House register to provide each firm’s identifier – needed for linking 
to ASHE and other business surveys in later analysis; 
• Quality assure the linking process; and  
• Create variables about the “defence-ness” of the firm using public sources. 
Evidence on Defence Sector Businesses 
Lists of Defence Businesses 
To construct a list of UK defence employers, a first source is the Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
procurement data, which details the main suppliers to the MOD. For the years 2012-2013 and 
2013-2014, MOD published a list of contractors with contract values greater than £5 million. 
There were 340 entries in 2012 and 337 in 2013. Across both samples there were 408 unique 
contractors.  
The list is first “cleaned”, removing foreign government bodies and international organisations, 
such as NATO. Second, a contract with the MOD does not mean a business is defence-
focused. For instance, the sample contains large accountancy firms, where the business, and 
so most of the employees, are likely to be working for non-defence clients. It would be 
impossible to identify the jobs related to defence work and the firm’s jobs are then unlikely to 
provide evidence about a defence premium. Thirdly, this source is biased towards the bigger 
firms as it focuses on contractors making sales of over £5 million to MOD. To some extent, this 
is an advantage as they are likely to be the largest employers so increasing the coverage of 
defence jobs in the study. 
A fourth issue is that businesses further down the supply chain are likely to be missed. For this 
final issue, other sources of defence businesses have been identified. The study integrates the 
companies that are members of ADS Group, the industry body for the aerospace, defence, 
security and space sectors. Such a data source is valuable in that businesses, in becoming a 
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member of the trade body, define themselves to be in the sector. However, the source can 
cover civil aerospace and organisations with a primary interest outside defence though having 
significant aerospace and defence sales. Also, the source is not curated extensively. When 
clerically checking this list, companies appear that have dissolved or merged with others, yet 
are still considered members. 
A more defence-focused list of businesses is the exhibitors at the Defence and Security 
Equipment International (DSEI) event. This is a trade show with a specific focus. The exhibitors 
are a mix of the largest businesses and smaller suppliers. One feature of this list is that it 
provides evidence about the diversity of industries – in the industrial classification sense – that 
are in defence and security. For example, textile businesses that supply military and security 
uniforms appear at DSEI but standard classification systems would place these businesses 
and their employees in non-defence industries. 
Commercial databases of businesses usually classify the business both using official systems 
such as SIC and then integrating other information. A list of businesses in defence and 
aerospace was drawn from InfoBase, which provided other fields, such as location and 
descriptions. The location meant removing businesses that – while operating in the UK – had 
no employment in the UK; the description was analysed to understand if the business was 
primarily civil aerospace. 
Identifying Companies House Numbers and Assuring the Matching Quality 
The next step was to add the Companies House numbers for each of the 1,335 companies. 
For this, an automated matching process found many firms and – because numbers remaining 
were modest – this was followed with manual Companies House web search and other portals 
such as Company Check.  
Where businesses could not be matched, the clerical search generally identified why this had 
occurred. Some businesses appear on UK defence lists but are registered outside the UK; 
some are located outside the UK with no operations in the UK. There are some businesses 
with complex ownership structures, including consortia of companies and government bodies. 
Some standard issues emerge also over time, with companies changing ownership and/or 
structure, such as those dissolved or merged and renamed, meaning that any direct links are 
dead. 
Table 3.1 indicates the number of companies that could be linked to Companies House from 
each of the lists. In total, all but 158 entities could be associated with a Companies House 
number. Next, the observations were merged with the variables in the Companies House 
database. From the 1,335 companies that make up our sample of the UK defence industry, 
1,155 were matched, leaving 180 unmatched. Most these 180 are the 158 observations 
without a Companies House number. The remaining companies have Companies House 
numbers but are now dissolved or foreign companies acknowledged with special codes but 
which are not contained in the UK database. 
The quality of this matching was checked by taking a random sample and checking for false 
matches. The merging of the sample of defence firms and the Companies House dataset was 
successful, as there were no false positives. 
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Table 3: Industries of Defence Businesses 
Source Description Strengths Issues Linked 
MOD2012 
Suppliers to the 
MOD in 2012/13 
where sales 
exceeded £5m 
Supply to MOD 
“necessary but 
not sufficient” 
indicator of 
defence-ness of 
business 
Includes non-
defence 
businesses and 
special entities 
supplying 
defence 
329 
MOD2013 
Suppliers to the 
MOD in 2013/14 
where sales 
exceeded £5m 
Covers diversity 
of businesses 
that supply 
defence outside 
defence 
manufacturers 
Only direct 
suppliers so 
missing the wider 
defence supply 
chain 
327 
ADS 
Members of the 
Aerospace 
Defence 
Security and 
Space industry 
group  
Membership 
means 
businesses self-
define as 
aerospace/defen
ce 
Need to remove 
the civil 
aerospace 
businesses 
1012 
INFOBASE 
Extract of 
defence and 
aerospace 
category from 
the commercial 
database. 
Additional 
descriptors 
available to both 
refine identifying 
as defence and 
to link to 
Companies 
House. 
Need to remove 
the civil 
aerospace 
businesses. 
Focuses on 
larger 
businesses; 
302 
DSEI 
Exhibitors at the 
2015 Defence 
and Security 
Equipment 
International 
trade show 
Covered small 
businesses in 
supply chain and 
focuses on 
businesses in 
security and 
defence 
Difficult to link to 
Companies 
House where 
businesses are 
small, new or 
non-UK 
492 
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Indicators of Defence-ness 
Table 3.2 gives one of the main indicators of the businesses’ industry, the primary SIC as 
reported in the commercial database FAME and Companies House. It focuses on the 
businesses identified in the defence sector using lists from MOD and ADS and indicates that 
the firms are categorised to a variety of industries. Traditionally, the defence sector has been 
defined as industries in SIC 354, 291, 301, 303, 304 and 6440. These are the manufacturing 
SICs with a marine, aviation and vehicles focus and the sub-categories covering armoured or 
military use. The 6440 is the defence activities SIC. However, table 3.2 shows some SICs 
outside this to be quite common. 
Table 3.3 explores linking the identified businesses to the FAME database about employment 
and turnover in the larger UK firms. Again, the focus are the MOD and ADS sourced 
businesses. As FAME is restricted to the largest firms, of the total 1,155 businesses, only 572 
businesses have employment in 2015 recorded. The average is high, at 2,365 employees. In 
total, these businesses employ 1.4 million people. This number is clearly an upper bound for 
defence jobs, covering all firms that supply defence including those that sell products of a non-
military nature to defence. Further, the jobs are those associated with the entire business, and 
not just the jobs associated with any defence-related work. 
Table 3.2: Industries of Defence Businesses 
Code Standard industrial classification code and description Frequency 
82990 Other business support service activities n.e.c. 77 
70229 Management consultancy activities (non-financial) 49 
62020 Information technology consultancy activities 46 
32990 Other manufacturing n.e.c. 42 
74909 Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c. 37 
26110 Manufacture of electronic components 35 
70100 Activities of head offices 32 
30300 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 30 
84220 Defence activities 25 
62090 Other information technology service activities 24 
25620 Machining 23 
25990 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 23 
62012 Business and domestic software development 23 
96090 Other service activities n.e.c. 20 
None Not supplied 76 
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This is evidenced by looking at the ADS list. There the focus is on suppliers to the defence 
related activities of MOD and the supply chain to these businesses. The employment would 
then exclude suppliers of a more general nature, such as business service firms. The 140 
businesses that report an employment level – average is 1,820 – then have total employment 
of just over 250,000. 
These two extremes are because the MOD supplier list – focusing on sales of £5 million to 
MOD – covers all industries and is less sensitive to whether the business is primarily a defence 
related supplier or not. The table also indicates how the amount of revenue from products sold 
to MOD can be used as an indicator of the “defence-ness” of a firm. By dividing the overall 
business turnover with that sold to MOD, some idea of the importance of the defence sales to 
the overall business can be derived.  
The research involved experimenting with such indicators, alongside the primary and 
secondary SIC’s to provide different sub-samples of the defence businesses that will be used 
in the further work. The preferred definition was all businesses excluding the large MOD 
suppliers whose sales to MOD was less than 15% of their turnover. A narrower definition then 
focused on the MOD supplier only, identifying these are tier 1/2 or prime suppliers. 
Table 3.3: Employment and turnover of defence businesses 
Sample Characteristic/indicator Average N= 
Whole Turnover of businesses covered by MOD and ADS £58M 639 
 
Employment of businesses covered by MOD and ADS 2,365 572 
 
Number of businesses in SIC 254, 291, 301, 303, 304  42 
ADS Turnover of businesses covered by ADS £31M 419 
 
Employment of businesses covered by ADS 1,820 140 
 
Number of businesses in SIC 254, 291, 301, 303, 304  26 
MOD Turnover of businesses covered by MOD in 2012 £1.2B 269 
 
Employment of businesses covered by MOD in 2012 4,695 188 
 
Number of businesses in SIC 254, 291, 301, 303, 304  23 
 
Turnover of businesses covered by MOD in 2013 £1.1B 269 
 
Employment of businesses covered by MOD in 2013 4,362 207 
 Number of businesses in SIC 254, 291, 301, 303, 304  23 
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Summarising the Identified Defence Businesses 
The next chapter describes the data underpinning this study. Each year, one percent of UK 
employees is sampled and their employers are surveyed about the jobs. Table 3.4 presents 
summary statistics for the 2012 sample of full-time jobs. It also presented the sub-sample of 
jobs that are in the defence businesses. 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics for full-time jobs, ASHE 2012 
  All businesses 
Defence 
businesses 
Variables Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
Gross pay £ 502.3 333.2 117012 639.0 
Age Year 40.869 11.873 117039 43.177 
Gender (females=1) Proportion 0.411 0.492 117039 0.175 
Total hours Hours per week 39.055 5.962 117039 39.456 
Average capital expenditure, all assets 3-yr log average 3.891 40.518 116944 6.454 
Defence businesses (=1) Proportion 0.007 0.084 117039 1.000 
Manufacturing (=1) Proportion 0.119 0.323 108997 0.668 
Defence prime (=1) Proportion 0.002 0.046 117039 0.297 
Shortage occupation (=1) Proportion 0.390 0.239 109760 0.451 
Private sector (=1) Proportion 0.680 0.467 117039 0.996 
Employment  Jobs 15351 38245 117030 5732 
Log Employment Log 7.085 2.842 116935 7.099 
Size (Large=1) Proportion 0.620 0.485 117039 0.578 
London Proportion 0.162 0.368 117039 0.042 
Southeast Proportion 0.135 0.341 117039 0.274 
 
As the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings is an employee-employer survey, it tends to 
focus on the largest businesses. Taking one per cent of all employees means that all large 
businesses are included but only about 3% of SMEs. This is borne out by the average size 
measures in table 3.4, Employment is 15,351, with 62% of businesses being large. The 
businesses defined as defence businesses are also large (58%) with just under 6000 full-time 
jobs. 
Defence jobs differ from the wider set of jobs in several aspects: 
• The jobholder tends to be older, on average aged 43 while the wider full-time workforce is 
41 years’ old. 
• Defence jobs tend to be filled by men with 17.5% of jobholder being women; in the wider 
set of full-time jobs, 39% are held by women. 
• Defence jobs are in establishments that are more capital intensive than other jobs; the 
jobs are also in manufacturing with only a third of the jobs being outside the sector. 
• Defence jobs are more likely to be in occupations that employers consider shortage, with 
45% being in shortage occupations versus the general picture of 39%.
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4. Methodology and Data Sources 
The wage premium associated with a sector or group is usually defined as the 
difference in pay in a sector/group compared to those outside that sector/group. This 
chapter looks at approaches to estimate wage premiums. It highlights how each need 
specifically compiled data about individual jobs, separating out those in defence from 
all other jobs and providing a high-quality estimate of the wage rate for the job. The data 
is supplemented by a range of characteristics about each job. 
The wider literature on estimating a wage premium is reviewed in an annex. The chapter 
describes the data about pay used for the study, the ONS Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings. 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
The main source of data used in the approaches to estimate wage premiums is the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). This is the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) principal 
source for earnings estimates, collected in April of each year, and uses data on about 120,000 
full-time employees.  
The sample selection is based on the National Insurance identifier, selecting all jobs held by 
one per cent of all NI numbers. HM Revenue and Customs shares with ONS the employer 
details for these jobs and ONS then asks the employers to fill out an ASHE record for each 
person identified. The largest employers, such as some of the largest defence firms, will 
definitely be surveyed, and about 1% of their employees will be recorded in ASHE. ASHE 
excludes serving members of the Armed Forces. Outside of that, the main category of 
employees that would not be included, part-time and/or low-paid employees who fall below 
National Insurance thresholds, fall outside the scope of this work which concentrates on full-
time employees. 
As the primary source of data is ASHE, there is a choice of the earnings measure. This study 
uses weekly earnings (including overtime) for employees. The modelling often relies on a 
regression of log-weekly earnings with the characteristics about the jobs that ASHE collects, 
namely: gender, age, location, sector and occupations. By linking the ASHE responses to other 
business surveys, a wider set of variables about the employer has also been used. For 
example, the capital expenditure associated with a business may be a significant explanatory 
variable of productivity and in turn wages. This has been added to the dataset by linking ASHE 
to the ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD). 
Estimating Wage Levels Controlling for Skills and Experience 
The first approach to estimating a wage premium focuses on modelling wage levels, using the 
ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Simple estimates of wages in comparison groups 
have the problem that the two groups are made up of a variety of different jobs and types of 
people. Using a raw average of mean hourly pay in both to compare earnings is often 
misleading, reflecting differences in the experience and skill levels associated with jobs, as well 
as the qualifications of employees. The location of the job can also be important. 
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This approach improves estimates of any wage premium by taking account of the 
comparability of jobs inside and outside the sectors of interest. An initial method is to select a 
few key variables, such as industry, and then to compare average wages. This can then be 
greatly improved through econometric estimation using job-level data and then controlling for 
the effects of employee and employer characteristics. This estimation then determines any 
remaining wage effect as attributable to the job being in a sector.  
Examples for this include Damant and Jenkins (2011) and ONS (2015) that focus on the public 
sector/private sector wage premium. While these studies only use ASHE, the studies by 
Bryson (2002), and Trotske (1994) move beyond this single dataset linking in other surveys 
about the employers. 
While a simple regression model provides considerable evidence, the study also uses a two-
stage approach to confirm the results of the wage equations. The first stage matches each 
defence job with a comparable non-defence job using propensity score matching (PSM). After 
PSM, the jobs in the matched group will have similar characteristics to those in the defence 
group, in terms of observable characteristics. So, as defence jobs tend to be filled with older, 
male workers, the matched group would include jobholders that have a similar average age 
and gender mix. In this work, a key factor to match on is the skills mix – defence jobs are later 
shown to have a higher level of competencies than is the case across all jobs. 
The second stage then compares the average wage in the defence jobs with the matched 
sample that has been constructed. The advantage of this method is that it tests – in the first 
stage – whether there are comparable jobs to the ones in defence. PSM can provide a robust 
comparison group but only if some assumptions hold. For example, there would need to be a 
similar non-defence job for each of the defence jobs. Whether this assumption holds can be 
tested. An annex indicates the results of these tests showing it has been possible to match the 
defence jobs to non-defence comparable jobs. 
Using Data on Job Switches to Estimate Wage Premiums 
A second approach improves the extent to which the comparison controls for worker 
characteristics. It uses panel data that tracks individuals each year as they have spells of 
employment. By following an individual, the approach can sidestep the fact that many 
employee characteristics are often unobservable. The approach then focuses on those 
employees that switch jobs between the sector of interest and the wider economy. Any change 
of wage rate is then attributable to the movement between sectors. This can be assumed 
because the worker characteristics are the same. Examples that use this approach include 
Disney and Gosling (1998, 2003), Girma and Gorg (2006). 
ASHE is also a longitudinal panel. Like many annual so-called employer-employee surveys, 
ASHE tracks the same employees each year. This is because the survey samples from the tax 
register and always selects the same 1% of employees, identified by the fact they have a 
specific final two digits in their National Insurance numbers. This means that ASHE as a panel 
can track an individual through spells of employment, including the leaving of a job and then 
subsequent spells of employment. Where these are in a different sector, the change has some 
particular estimation advantages for looking at wage premiums. 
The key advantage of this data is that the employee – as s/he moves job – is unlikely to have 
any change in characteristics bar those related to the additional year. This would be about both 
observable characteristics and unobservable, so any change in wage is primarily due to the 
switch in jobs. Where employees move from the sector of interest to another sector, any 
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change in wage would be driven by the change in employer rather than employee 
characteristics, so that modelling can focus on estimating the wage premium only controlling 
for employer aspects. 
The problem with this approach has generally been regarding the number of observations that 
can be found in surveys such as ASHE. The sample size could be small for all but the largest 
groups of employees because job change into or out of a sector may not be frequent. Further, 
the data about the job change itself may be inadequate. There remains the risk that a 
measured premium is explained by unobservable factors, such as self-selection into the sector 
or the ability of firms to recruit the best graduates. This could be the case due to a challenging 
working environment, relative job security, the prestige associated with defence or any other 
unobservable factor. Researchers have then explored various instances where these two 
problems can be overcome. Sometimes a sector switch is forced on an employee: Gibbons 
and Katz (1989) and Abowd et al (2013) look at the wage effects of firm closure as employees 
en masse leave the sector where a business has closed.
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The ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings surveys a 1% sample of jobs in Great 
Britain, including those in defence businesses. This provides the occupation, the pay 
and the hours of work for around 120,000 full time jobs. The survey can also be linked to 
the employer business and so identify any jobs in the businesses considered to be 
supplying defence products. This means ASHE can be used to estimate any wage 
premium associated with jobs in defence when compared with those outside of defence. 
This chapter indicates some results of this, using different approaches to quantify the 
premium.  
ASHE surveys the jobs, for a specific reference week each year, associated with a one per 
cent sample of National Insurance numbers. The survey provides a comprehensive set of data 
about GB jobs. Exclusions are minimal: serving members of the Armed Forces are exempt. 
Further, some jobs do not require an employer to make a return to HMRC, usually because the 
pay associated with the job is below tax threshold. 
Table 5.1: Wage premium estimates for Defence jobs 
Design Year Defence Premium 
Additional 
Maritime Additional Aviation 
Defence jobs 
matched to 
non-defence 
using PSM 
2012 8%*** 1% 19%*** 
2013 5%*** 3% 8%* 
2014 12%*** 5% 11% 
Regression of wages on defence dummy plus skills, age, location variables 
All defence 
business 
jobs 
2012 12% 3% 11%** 
2013 11%*** 3% 10%*** 
2014 7%*** 8% 15%*** 
Defence 
businesses 
restricted 
definition 
2012 14%*** n/a n/a 
2013 13%*** n/a n/a 
2014 14%*** n/a n/a 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Regression results and propensity score match 
used age, gender, O*NET, ESS shortage and hard-to-fill variables and the size, capital expenditure and 
location of the business The restricted definition excluded firms likely to be mainly civilian, removing ADS 
members but who did not participate in the defence focused DSEI. 
The employers are asked to supply the occupation, location and pay associated with the job 
and the gender and age of the employee. The data on individual jobs can be linked to details 
about the employer and table 5.1 indicates results when the wage premium in jobs in 
businesses identified in chapter 3 as “defence” is estimated. Two results are found: each 
estimation supports a premium of around 5-12% for defence jobs. Further, there is no 
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additional premium for jobs located in centres of maritime employment (such as naval 
dockyards), while there is one for aviation related employment. These are additional, so results 
indicate that a naval premium exists, but it is no different to that seen in other areas of defence. 
Finally, a more restricted definition, focusing on businesses that may be considered prime 
suppliers (or Tier 1/2) has a similar level of pay premium. This chapter details these headline 
results. 
Trends in Annual Pay Levels 
The pay of employees is reported annually by ONS when it publishes the results of its Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings. Figure 5.1 plots out the published annual median gross pay of 
all respondents, those in manufacturing industries and those in five industries often regarded 
as supplying defence. 
Figure 5.1: Gross Annual Pay Full-time Employees (£ pa), 2004-14 
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Wider Defence is a weighted average across industry medians: Automotive (SIC 291), Aerospace (303), 
Shipbuilding (301), Military Fighting Vehicles (304) and Manufacture of weapons and ammunition (254). 
SIC 291, 301 and 303 will include employees working in businesses largely focused on civilian and military. 
Source is calculations from published ASHE, annual, median, full-time pay estimates by SIC. 
The highest pay is related to jobs in automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding, covering both 
civil and military use, and combining this with the businesses in the two military focused 
industries, Military Fighting Vehicles and Manufacture of weapons and ammunition. This is 
titled “wider” defence because it is likely that many of the jobs are related to production for 
civilian use. 
For comparison, the All economy and Manufacturing industries ASHE results are presented. 
The main notable features of making this comparison is that the wider defence measure has 
consistently been higher than both manufacturing and the All economy measures, by at least 
ten per cent. There is persistence in the gap, with the wider defence measure being almost a 
quarter greater than manufacturing and about 20% greater than the all economy pay level. 
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Figure 5.2: Wage premium by industrial sector for full time employees 
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Wider Defence is a weighted average across industry medians: Automotive (SIC 291), Aerospace (303), 
Shipbuilding (301), Military Fighting Vehicles (304) and Manufacture of weapons and ammunition (254). 
SIC 291, 301 and 303 will include employees working in businesses largely focused on civilian and military. 
Source is calculations from published ASHE, annual, median, full-time pay estimates by SIC. 
Figure 5.2 focuses on the defence premium over manufacturing at a more disaggregated level 
for the wider defence industries. It separates out the premium seen in 2004-2011 and the 
premium seen in 2012-14 and indicates the rise has been most pronounced in the automotive, 
ship building and aerospace industries. The sample size in ASHE for the weapons and military 
vehicles industry is quite small, but the premium has declined here. The other observation is 
that, in percentage terms, the premium rise is stable, so a large part of widening gap in the top 
panel is the general wage increases acting on an existing wage premium. This highlights that 
the wage premium is persistent.  
However, there are some caveats to whether this indicates a premium associated with defence 
related jobs. Firstly, the businesses that are identified in these industries are a mix of those 
selling to both defence and non-defence purchasers. A second aspect identified by looking at 
defence businesses individually is that they are in industries beyond the manufacturing ones 
identified above.  
The rest of this chapter uses the work to identifying defence businesses to focus on jobs in 
defence. Rather than using SIC codes, the jobs analysed are identified by whether the 
employer sales are largely to defence or marketed to defence departments. 
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Occupations and Pay in Defence 
After linking the defence businesses identified in chapter 3 to the 2012 Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings, 832 full-time jobs are found. This is about 0.7% all full-time jobs covered by 
ASHE. In responding to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, employers are asked about 
the occupation of each job. Table 5.2 presents the occupations which appear in the defence 
businesses and the wider ASHE sample. The results for 2013 and 2014 are similar, indicated 
in the annex. 
The body of the table lists the occupations where more than ten jobs occur in the defence 
businesses, while the note to the table indicates the rest of the occupations found in defence 
businesses. The table also indicates how many jobs ASHE contains that fall in these 
occupations but are in businesses outside of defence. 
The most common occupation is Science, Research, Engineering and Technology 
Professionals. The 169 jobs in defence businesses also represent 3.1% of all the jobs in SOC 
21 found in ASHE. Overall, the table presents a picture of defence roles primarily concentrated 
in engineering related occupations. As well as the professional science grades, defence has a 
high number of associate professionals in this field. 
Table 5.2 provides data about jobs that are in locations primarily associated with maritime and 
air defence plants. Only 39 and 67 jobs are categorised as defence marine and defence air 
businesses. Many occupations have less than 10 jobs reported in ASHE and so fall below the 
threshold at which ASHE estimates are representative. 
The ASHE is primarily a survey of pay. The employers are asked about a reference week for 
each job and then complete questions about various components of overall pay, including 
incentive pay, overtime and any pension contributions, alongside the hours worked and the 
gender and age of the employee. Table 5.3 summarises the pay and hours data for the 2012 
full-time jobs. The defence jobs have a higher weekly average pay, with those jobs located 
near aviation -related plants having a higher pay rate. 
Table 5.3 appears to present evidence of a premium in weekly gross pay for defence jobs. 
Defence jobs have a weekly gross pay of £700, about £118 greater than all jobs in ASHE. 
However, it is very unlikely to be an accurate estimate of a wage premium because the 832 
defence jobs involve individuals that differ from the wider ASHE sample. Potentially, the entire 
pay difference could reflect, not the fact that the employers are involved in defence, but just 
that defence tends to have jobs requiring higher skilled or experienced employees. Were these 
individuals to move out of the defence sector, it may be that the individuals would find, on 
average, higher paid jobs. 
  
33 
5. Wage Premium Estimates 
Table 5.2: ASHE Full-Time Defence and non-Defence Jobs by Occupation, 2012 
SOC Description Defence Of which:  All jobs Defence jobs 
   
Marine Air 
  
11 Corporate Managers And Directors 57 <10 <10  6,768  0.8% 
21 
Science, Research, Engineering And 
Technology Professionals 
169 <10 12  5,379  3.1% 
24 Business, Media And Public Service 
Professionals 
39 <10 <10  4,867  0.8% 
25 19 <10 <10  1,100  1.7% 
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Science, Eng'ing & Tech Ass 
Prof'nals 
71 <10 <10  3,480  2.0% 
35 Business And Public Service 
Associate Professionals 
63 <10 <10  7,892  0.8% 
36 10 <10 <10  2,217  0.5% 
41 Administrative Occupations 43 <10 0  7,702  0.6% 
42 Secretarial And Related Occupations 41 <10 <10  8,515  0.5% 
52 
Skilled Metal, Elec'l/Electronic 
Trades 
133 11 20  5,095  2.6% 
53 
Skilled Construction & Building 
Trades 
11 <10 <10  2,015  0.5% 
81 Process, Plant & Machine Operatives 74 <10 <10  4,776  1.5% 
82 Transport Drivers And Operatives 20 0 0  4,647  0.4% 
91 Elementary Trades, Administration,  13 0 0  2,532  0.5% 
93 Service And Related Occupations 24 <10 <10  5,721  0.4% 
All All Occupations 832 39 67 117,039  0.7% 
Occupations where fewer than 10 defence jobs in ASHE: Other Managers And Proprietors (SOC 12), 
Other Managers And Proprietors (13), Health Professionals (22), Teaching And Educational 
Professionals (23), Protective Service Occupations (33), Culture, Media And Sports Occupations (34), 
Textiles, Printing And Other Skilled Trades (54), Caring Personal Service Occupations (61), Leisure, 
Travel And Related Personal Service Occupations (62), Sales Occupations (71), Customer Service 
Occupations (72) and Elementary Administration And Service Occupations (92). For Marine and Air jobs, 
<10 indicates fewer than 10 jobs in ASHE. Marine and Air jobs have been identified by linking job location 
to the location of major marine/aerospace plants. 
Table 5.2 gives an indication of the differences between the jobs in defence and those outside 
of defence. Occupations related to science and engineering are more common in businesses 
operating in defence. Occupations, however, are a blunt indicator of skills and experience 
giving only a qualitative understanding of the role. Table 5.4 offers some evidence about the 
skills profile of defence jobs. 
The US Department for Labor has sought to define occupations in terms of the skills and 
experience employers expect in those filling the jobs. The Occupational Network (O*NET) 
conducts surveys of employers asking them to identify the occupations that are common in 
their businesses and then to score the importance of different skills. For each occupation, the 
O*NET work provides a score on around fifty categories of skills and experience for all SOC 
codes. For this study, the scores have been distilled into nineteen composite indicators using 
factor analysis. Average scores are tabulated in table 5.4 for all the jobs in ASHE, the defence 
jobs in ASHE and, of these, those located in maritime and aviation employment centres. A 
higher score means that a certain attribute is more important, while a smaller/more negative 
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score indicates that it is less important. The description for each factor indicators how each is a 
composite across a range of different skills/experiences. Some are relatively unique, such as 
“Physics”, but most cover a mix of qualities. 
Table 5.3: Defence and non-Defence Weekly Pay Averages for 2012 
    Different pay measures drawing from ASHE 
  
Number of 
jobs 
Weekly 
hours 
Gross Pay Basic Pay 
Gross excl 
Overtime 
Defence jobs 832 39.1 £700.92 £630.60 £669.92 
Of which: 
Maritime 
39 39.6 £698.09 £598.97 £636.04 
Of which: 
Aviation 
67 38.5 £742.84 £631.54 £706.78 
ALL JOBS 117,039 39.1 £581.67 £538.36 £565.29 
 
The factors are split into three classes: skills, activities and knowledge. These originate from 
the O*NET work. Further, the order in the table of each factor is by importance of the factor. 
So, the “People, Systems and Operations” factor explains most of the difference in employers’ 
views on the skills needed by each occupation. Going down the factors, these become less 
important. 
The statistical analysis to distil the indicators means that each is centred around zero for the 
analysis of all jobs in ASHE. This means that the “All jobs” column has some factors that score 
positively, some negatively. A first result to note is that the defence jobs are generally better 
skilled than all ASHE jobs. A positive factor score across (nearly) all the factors suggests that 
the occupations in defence jobs were associated with high scores from the employers 
surveyed for O*NET. 
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Table 5.4: Average skills profile of jobs using O*NET survey 
Factor Description All  jobs 
Defence 
Jobs 
Maritime 
Jobs 
Aviation 
Jobs 
Skills variables     
People, Systems and Operations 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.36 
Materials, Equipment & Technical -0.19 0.50 0.60 0.80 
Programming and equipment -.0.04 0.75 0.48 0.82 
Coordination and Persuasion 0.06 0.28 0.36 0.21 
Active learning skills 0.05 0.42 0.19 0.65 
Activities variables     
Analysing, processing information, consulting, advising 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.27 
Problem solving, negotiating, control, planning & prioritising 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.27 
Handling, inspecting objects, machines and vehicles, 
coordinating people 0.16 0.55 0.29 0.80 
Monitoring processes, materials and surroundings and 
selling and influencing -0.17 0.30 0.50 
0.50 
Coaching people, inspecting equipment & structures and 
selling & influencing 0.18 0.54 0.52 -0.48 
Knowledge variables     
Humanities, Law, Education and Chemistry -0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.03 
Science, Econ, Computer Languages, Arts & Geography 0.08 0.08 1.12 1.01 
Engineering, Education, Public safety, Food production -0.11 0.77 0.13 0.23 
Telecom, Mechanical, Personnel and human resources 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.62 
Transportation, Philosophy and Theology 0.13 0.51 0.07 -0.08 
Psychology, Biology, Sociology and Anthropology 0.00 0.10 0.21 -0.37 
Clerical, Therapy and counselling -0.08 0.28 0.45 -0.28 
Mathematics knowledge -0.07 0.17 0.48 -0.41 
Physics knowledge -0.18 0.31 0.00 0.00 
 
Generally, defence jobs are in occupations judged to require high levels of skills, experience 
and knowledge. While the jobs located in maritime and aviation focused employment centres 
also have high levels, they are generally similar in the mix to the defence. Overall, this 
suggests that any comparison of defence pay with the wider economy average in terms of pay 
would miss the fact that these jobs are likely to need to pay at a higher rate to attract the higher 
skills needed than the average job. 
Table 5.5 indicates the geographical spread of defence jobs. A notable feature is that there are 
few defence jobs located in London. Any London-associated premium usually needs some 
specific modelling, because of the different labour market conditions observed in the capital. 
This analysis has used a simple approach (of using a London dummy) to control for jobs that 
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are in London, both in the defence firms and those used to compare pay with defence jobs. 
While there are few jobs in London, the concentration in the Southeast should be noted. 
London’s wage impact spreads into the Southeast, so that the defence jobs here attract some 
wage premium due to location. 
Table 5.5: ASHE Full-Time Defence and non-Defence Jobs by Region, 2012 
Region Description Defence Of which:  All jobs Defence jobs 
Ref 
  
Maritime Aviation 
  
9 South East 219 ** 0 15,746 1.4% 
2 North West 137 23 21 12,996 1.1% 
6 South West 108 ** 0 9,583 1.1% 
5 West Midlands 64 0 0 10,403  0.6% 
4 East Midlands 53 0 0 8,524  0.6% 
7 East 52 0 ** 10,432  0.5% 
8 London 36 0 0 18,960  0.2% 
3 Yorks & Humber 25 0 ** 9,803 0.3% 
1 North East 17 0 0 4,616 0.4% 
 
England 711 
  
101,063  0.7% 
10 Wales 48 36 36 5,244  0.9% 
11 Scotland 73 0 0 10,732 0.7% 
 
There is some evidence of jobs being concentrated in particular locations, related to the 
location of large military establishments. This may be problematic, in that ensuring jobs are 
comparable to the defence jobs may not be easy if the defence jobs dominate a geographical 
labour market. However, the table indicates defence jobs are spread across Great Britain, 
somewhat ameliorating this. 
Evidence of Wage Premium from Job Switchers 
A feature of the ASHE is that it maintains the same individuals in each year of the survey. The 
approach taken by ONS is to contact the employers of individuals with a National Insurance 
number that ends in two specific digits. This means that, if the individual moves from one 
employer to another, that fact is retrieved if it is caught in two successive ASHE waves. 
The change in job of an individual has a useful statistical property. Except for the additional 
year of experience, the job holder maintains all his/her characteristics. As has been noted 
before, a problem for analysis of the wage premium is that the individual characteristics, many 
unobserved in the data, may be a significant determinant of any premium. However, focusing 
on switchers can guarantee characteristics are the same except for the feature of interest: the 
individual working for a defence business. Also, those entering defence businesses from 
outside can be compared with the flow in the opposite direction. This allows some control for 
the fact of moving job being correlated with stronger motivation. 
The ASHE data was organised to look at individuals over two years. This meant some 
individuals and their jobs had to be removed as observations in successive years were not 
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present. Where someone entering a defence job was not employed in the previous year – they 
may have been studying – or were not included in ASHE – serving in the Armed Forces for 
example – then their subsequent appearance in ASHE on joining a defence business could not 
be used. There would be no evidence of their earlier pay. Equally, many individuals who were 
in a defence business one year but not in that business in the following year could not be 
tracked. This may reflect a retirement or some other departure from employment. 
The analysis was initially undertaken for the 2012-14 period, but sample sizes for those 
switching in and out of defence jobs were too small for robust analysis. ASHE has been 
undertaken for many decades, so offering a way to increase the sample size. However, going 
back over time has one limitation. The identification of business as defence was undertaken in 
2016 and becomes less precise going back in time. Hence, the 2009-14 period was used, 
allowing analysis of five periods of job change from 2009-10 to 2013-14. 
Between 2009 and 2014, there were 153 individuals that moved into defence businesses from 
non-defence businesses and about the same moving the other way. The move to defence 
businesses was accompanied by an average pay rise of 10%, while the moves out of defence 
a 5% pay rise. A problem associated with each of these statistics is that variation is high. 
However, this difference is significant at 5% confidence level: moving jobs does increase pay 
but the pay increase is significantly higher for those moving into defence when compared to 
those moving out.  
Table 5.6: Evidence of pay changes for those switching from and to defence jobs, 2009-14 
Pay change as individuals…    
…Take up jobs in defence businesses +10.22% Significant at 1% Difference is +4.79% 
…Leave jobs in defence businesses +5.43% Not significant at 10% Difference is +4.79% 
…Stay in defence jobs +3.49% Base pay increase F(1,3693) = 4.9, significant at 5% 
Note: Increase in hourly wage rate for full-time employees in defence jobs plus those exiting defence. 
Significance tests for whether pay increases for movers different from stayers and secondly whether the 
rise for those entering jobs in defence significantly higher than those leaving defence businesses. 
Table 5.6 summarises the pay changes seen in the subsample of people who move into 
defence jobs from outside defence and those that move the other way. It also looks at those 
that stay in defence. It presents evidence of a pay premium in defence, indicating that those 
entering jobs in defence business received pay rise of 4.8 per cent greater than those moving 
out of those businesses. This difference is significant at 5 percent confidence.  
Table 5.6 indicates also that – while those staying in defence get an annual pay increase of 
3.5% - those moving into defence jobs see a 10% pay increase. This is significant (at 1%). 
Those moving the other way, into defence from outside, only see a 5.4% pay rise, which is not 
statistically different to the annual pay increase in defence jobs. 
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Determinants of the Wage Premium 
Since Mumford and Smith (2004), research has adopted the human capital model as the 
theoretical basis for the earnings function (an extensive recent survey is Chiswick, 2003). At 
the employee level, it is assumed that wages increase with measures of accumulated skills 
such as education, work experience, and training. Further, demographic variables and 
occupation- and workplace-specific effects are used. The overlaps between these categories 
mean that, in aggregate, a comprehensive list of variables measuring the relative productivity 
of workers can be compiled. 
Wages are modelled to be correlated to the skills and experience associated with the 
individual. A problem is that ASHE does not contain the skills of individuals, as the survey does 
not contact the individuals directly. However, the occupation code, linked to O*NET as it asks 
about the skills related to an occupation and to the Employer Skills Survey about the difficulty 
to fill occupations, has meant some skill-related variables have been created. 
Measures of work experience are usually assumed to be positively related to wages via the 
ability to acquire skills over the period the employee has spent working. Typically, studies do 
not have data on the history of actual lifetime work experience across firms for individuals. 
Instead proxies are provided, the most common of which is potential experience: the age of the 
individual.  
The study includes some further job characteristics, focusing on the full-time jobs and then 
including the hours worked in estimation. Finally, the demographic information in ASHE 
includes the gender of the employee. 
Table 5.7 presents results for 2014. It indicates the regression results from modelling the wage 
equation using interaction terms. Such regressions underpin the driver analysis for this study 
and the table also indicates the results for 2014, as “Contribution to premium”. 
The estimation for all jobs indicates the basic determinants of wages from the 106,609 
observations. Wages are positively related to age of the employee and where the employee is 
male. It is also positively related to the size and capital intensity of the employer and whether 
the business is in London or the Southeast.  
An important part of this modelling is to look at the interaction between characteristics and the 
fact of being a defence job. In Table 5.7, the focus for the interaction is on the age and gender 
of the jobholder and the skills and extent of shortage in the occupations. Because of the range 
of skills modelled, the aggregate impact across the different skills factors is calculated. The 
table also presents the mean of all variables, both for the whole sample of jobs (on the left-
hand side panel) and the defence jobs only (on the right-hand side panel). 
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Table 5.7: Determinants of the wage premium, 2014 
 Contribution to 
premium 
Estimates for all jobs Interaction term 
 ß ß s.e Mean ß s.e Mean 
Constant 0.045 5.340 0.010 1.000 0.045 0.063 1.000 
Prime 0.013 0.045 0.034 0.002 n/a   
Age -0.013 0.006 0.000 40.90 0.00 0.00 43.63 
Gender  -0.010 -0.135 0.003 0.41 -0.06 0.04 0.17 
Shortage occupation (=1) 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.39 0.09 0.05 0.44 
Skills proxies total -0.002 TOTAL OVER ALL SKILLS TOTAL OVER ALL SKILLS 
People, Systems and Operations -0.011 0.034 0.004 0.16 -0.16 0.06 0.07 
Materials, Equipment & Technical 0.026 0.068 0.005 -0.19 0.05 0.06 0.48 
Programming and equipment -0.119 -0.008 0.004 -0.03 -0.16 0.05 0.72 
Coordination and Persuasion -0.005 0.019 0.002 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.27 
Active learning skills -0.005 -0.017 0.002 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.40 
Analysing, processing information, consulting, advising 0.028 0.052 0.003 0.01 0.18 0.04 0.15 
Problem solving, negotiating, control, planning & prioritising 0.062 0.148 0.004 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.53 
Handling, inspecting objects, machines and vehicles, coordinating people -0.041 -0.054 0.006 -0.17 -0.14 0.07 0.29 
Monitoring processes, materials and surroundings and selling & influencing -0.020 -0.109 0.003 0.18 0.04 0.04 -0.52 
Coaching people, inspecting equipment & structures and selling & influencing -0.001 -0.028 0.002 -0.07 0.09 0.03 -0.01 
Humanities, Law, Education and Chemistry 0.009 0.062 0.003 0.08 -0.11 0.04 -0.08 
Science, Econ, Computer Languages, Arts & Geography 0.039 -0.013 0.003 -0.10 0.05 0.04 0.75 
Engineering, Education, Public safety, Food production -0.006 0.105 0.003 0.15 -0.04 0.04 0.15 
Telecom, Mechanical, Personnel and human resources 0.017 0.010 0.003 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.49 
Transportation, Philosophy and Theology 0.005 -0.021 0.002 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.10 
Psychology, Biology, Sociology and Anthropology 0.017 0.064 0.002 -0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.27 
Clerical, Therapy and counselling 0.004 0.025 0.002 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.17 
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 Contribution to 
premium 
Estimates for all jobs Interaction term 
 ß ß s.e Mean ß s.e Mean 
Mathematics knowledge 0.002 0.014 0.002 -0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.30 
Physics knowledge -0.002 -0.055 0.002 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.06 
Total hours  0.01 0.00 39.17 n/a   
Capital exp (£’00/employee)  0.00 0.00 3.29 n/a   
Apprentice (=1)  -0.30 0.01 0.01 n/a   
Manufacturing (=1)  0.06 0.00 0.12 n/a   
Private sector (=1)  -0.03 0.00 0.71 n/a   
Employment (00.000)  0.00 0.00 0.00 n/a   
Log Employment  0.02 0.00 0.00 n/a   
Size (Large=1) 
 
-0.01 0.00 0.61 n/a   
London 
 
0.25 0.00 0.16 n/a   
Southeast 
 
0.07 0.00 0.14 n/a   
Number of obs. 106,609 R-Squared 0.4977 Adj R-Squared 0.4972 
 
Contribution to the premium is calculated by multiplying the interaction co-efficient by the mean of the characteristic for the defence firms. 
The contribution to the premium column estimates the contribution to the wage premium of the characteristic of the average defence job 
when compared to all jobs. The two mean columns show the difference between defence jobs and all jobs in ASHE: those in defence 
jobs are nearly 44 years old, three years older than all jobholders.   
The table gives the premium for defence jobs over comparable jobs and then attributes the premium to the interaction of being a defence 
business and the different aspects of the job. For example, there is a premium for shortage occupations and this occurs across different 
sectors: where employers identify a shortage occupation, this correlates with a wage premium. However, in defence jobs this effect is 
enhanced, contributing about 4% of the overall 7% premium in the table. Another feature identified in the table is that the pay of 
employees in the defence firms identified as primes – these businesses lead large contracts for the Ministry of Defence – contributes 
about one per cent to the premium.  
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Overall, the disaggregation highlights what is driving the premium. Some of the premium is 
associated with the businesses that are defence primes having higher wage levels. This 
means implicitly that the supply chain and lower tier defence businesses have lower wage 
premium. The effect is not very large, but may suggest that the more competitive parts of the 
defence sector have a lower wage premium. 
BOX: Statistical estimation of a wage premium 
The most straightforward analysis of a defence premium is to run a regression of the (log) 
gross pay, w, for all jobs on the characteristics of the job, X, and with a dummy variable to 
identify those in defence: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
The estimations presented extract the wage premium but this can be further disaggregated. 
To achieve this disaggregation, the model is augmented using interaction terms on the 
characteristics variable: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾′+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
To estimate the effect of the different characteristics in the estimation of the defence wage 
level, the difference between the two models is used. An account can be generated for each 
of the variables using the average values taken in the defence jobs. 
There are occupations that employers say have shortages and this is highly correlated with the 
wage premium, contributing about half. This suggests that the labour supply constraints in 
specialisms needed for defence production are causing businesses to pay a higher wage rate. 
This is more in line with a productivity argument for the defence wage premium, with 
businesses offering higher wages to attract the labour needed.  
The individual skills – providing the bulk of the results in the table – do not in themselves 
correlate with the premium. However, the table can be used to demonstrate how important 
skills are in determining the wage rate for a defence job. The mean skill scores for the defence 
jobs is far higher than those the wider workforce and this skills base means the average 
defence job is paid about 15% more than the wider workforce. Earlier comparisons of the pay 
in defence compared to the whole economy indicate that this would represent about two thirds 
of the pay differential between defence jobs and other jobs. Skills do matter in setting pay, 
because the level is higher for defence jobs. However, the defence sector does not pay a 
premium for individual skills, as the reward for skills is similar to that found in other industries. 
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6. Conclusions 
There may be an economic rationale for wage premiums in the defence sector: The defence 
industry can capture economic rents, partly because many of the firms are specialists in their 
fields, customising products to the needs of the UK Ministry of Defence. Efficiency wages could 
also play a role in wage setting in the defence sector. As firms are highly specialised, workers 
acquire sector-specific skills, that can also be valuable in adjacent sectors, such as related civil 
sectors. To reduce turnover and reduce the loss of intellectual property, firms may choose to 
pay higher wages. Lastly, there could also be aspects related to the defence sector that 
workers would want to be compensated for or for which they merit a premium. This could 
include, for example, the need for security clearance and the costs associated with the 
confidentiality of the work.  
This study uses a rich dataset about one percent of jobs in Great Britain, including those in 
defence businesses. The ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings provides the occupation, 
the pay and the hours of work for around 120,000 full-time jobs. The survey can also be linked 
to the employer business and so identify any jobs in the businesses considered to be supplying 
defence products. This means ASHE – when combined with some other datasets – can be 
used to estimate any wage premium associated with jobs in defence when compared with 
those outside of defence. 
In 2012, 832 jobs were identified. These defence jobs have a weekly gross pay of £700, about 
£118 greater than all jobs in ASHE. The jobs are more likely to be in occupations “Science, 
Research Engineering and technical Professionals”, “Science, Research Engineering and 
technical Associates”, “Skilled Metal, Electrical and Electronic Trades”, “Process, Plant and 
Machine Operatives: than the wider ASHE sample. These occupations mean that the jobs are 
associated with skills and knowledge that are focused on science engineering. Using data 
about the skills and experience associated with these occupations, the study has sought 
control any premium because the defence jobs are likely to involve individuals that differ from 
the wider ASHE sample. 
The data on individual jobs has been linked to details about the employer and the skills and 
experience associated with the occupation of each job. The wage premium in jobs in 
businesses identified as “defence” is estimated. Two results are found: each estimation 
supports a premium of around 5-12% for defence jobs. Further, there is no additional premium 
for jobs located in centres of maritime employment (such as naval dockyards), while there is 
one for aviation related employment. Finally, a more restricted definition, focusing on 
businesses that may be considered prime suppliers (or Tier 1/2) has a same level. 
A concern in attributing wage differences that the entire pay difference could reflect, not the 
fact that the employers are involved in defence related work, but just that defence tends to 
have jobs requiring higher skilled or experienced employees. Were these individuals to move 
out of the defence sector, it may be that the individuals would find, on average, higher paid 
jobs.  
Much of this study has sought to extract from the wage premium the effect of any difference 
due to employees’ skills and experience. The study finds that just over half the defence 
premium is explained because of the correlation between the occupations that defence recruits 
and occupations that employers consider as having shortages. 
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Further Work 
There remain some gaps in the research presented and some aspects where further work may 
enlarge the understanding of the economic value of defence jobs. 
The ASHE survey has limitations. Its sample, while relatively high in comparison to labour 
force surveys, does become too small when analysing local labour markets and focusing 
specific industries. In this study, the focus has stayed on the defence sector and not delved 
deeply into the defence industry in parts of the UK. However, there is considerable interest in 
clusters of defence activity, especially because government policy has sometimes focused on 
such clusters. To look at the defence sector at this detailed level alternative data sources 
would be needed. 
The study could not consider the pay of specific professions or categories of employee. For the 
former, policy is particularly focused on whether specialist engineering roles are being filled 
and, if not, how the gaps that emerge might be managed or ameliorated. This issue was raised 
in the interviews with defence stakeholders. Equally, there is considerable interest in the 
careers of former service personnel in the defence sector. 
To track such groups of employees, the empirical approaches used in this study are probably 
appropriate, however specific data will need to be collected. The possible sources for more 
detailed analysis are developing. Administrative data about employment are increasingly being 
used for productivity related analysis, such as returns made to HM Revenue and Customs. 
Also, as the MOD procures, information is gathered about the employment associated with 
large contracts. These sources are complex and may also need to supplemented by specific 
data collections.
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In economic models, workers are paid the marginal product of their labour in a perfectly 
competitive market. Therefore, workers with equal productivity are expected to earn the same 
wage. Nevertheless, it is a long-established fact that wages vary substantially by industry, 
region, gender and other factors such as unionisation or firm size. There exists a literature to 
explain, or “explain away”, these apparent wage premiums. Two dominant strands of theories 
have emerged: 
• Difference in pay are due to differences in unmeasured ability: This theory maintains that 
workers are paid according to their marginal product, but that differences arise because 
not all aspects of worker productivity can be observed. Studies in this tradition usually rely 
on difference-in-difference or fixed effects regressions to control for unmeasured 
heterogeneity across workers.  
• True wage differences do exist and are due to market imperfections: This literature 
asserts that even when controlling for unobservable characteristics, wage premiums do 
not fully disappear. There are then several theories that explain the persistence of wage 
differences, such as efficiency wages, rent sharing, or compensation for undesirable 
aspects of the work.  
Difference in Pay due to Unmeasured Ability 
The main challenge in estimating the effect of ability is many aspects in a sample of workers 
remain unmeasured and so it is difficult estimating a wage premium controlling for these 
unmeasured ability drivers. Often this challenge is met by using a panel of workers switching 
employer that allows controlling for worker fixed effects. Alternatively, there are sometimes 
natural experiments, such as the closing of a plant, that control for any endogeneity of the 
switching decision. In the following, we present types of wage premiums that have been 
investigated in this fashion.  
One of the most frequently investigated issues is the existence of a public sector wage 
premium. For the UK, Disney and Gosling have looked at this issue from two different angles. 
First, Disney and Gosling (1998) compare pay distributions between the public and private 
sectors. After controlling for age and education, they found large differences. Women and 
those with intermediate education did best in the public sector. The wage premium was 
shrinking over the study period (1983-1995) when controlling for occupational composition of 
both sectors.  
However, not everybody benefited from the premium: men with higher education degrees and 
women without qualifications were worse off in the public sector. Using panel and quintile 
regressions with individual fixed effects, the authors also looked at individuals moving between 
the public and the private sector. They find a positive effect of moving to the public sector. 
However, this is most likely due to penalties when moving in the other direction, from public to 
private, due to public-sector specific skills previously acquired. All of these results can be 
explained by the relative quality of graduates: those with higher grades tend to go to the private 
sector. Furthermore, higher rates of unionisation tend to reduce the variance of wages in the 
public sector, benefitting women and those with intermediate skills.  
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In a follow-up study, Disney and Gosling (2003) examine privatisation in the British economy. 
This followed the impact on wages when workers moved from the public to the private sector. 
Because the movement into the public sector was irrespective of workers tastes and 
productivity, this eliminates the problem of self-selection. Still, they confirm the earlier finding 
that women earn a premium in the public sector.  
From a similar starting point, Bryson (2002) tries to determine the existence of a union 
membership wage premium. Traditionally, union members earn more than non-union 
members, but taking union membership as deterministic of higher wages is hard to square with 
the fact that union membership has been on the decline. To control for most other factors 
determining wages, Bryson therefore uses propensity score matching (PSM) to form a control 
group of non-unionised workers with similar characteristics to their unionised peers. 
Unfortunately, the author had only one cross-section available, from the 1998 WERS, and was 
therefore not able to observe differences over time. Nevertheless, controlling for other 
observable factors through PSM significantly reduced the size of the trade union premium. The 
premium only remained statistically significant in covered workplaces, where union members 
tended to earn 6.4 per cent more than their non-unionised peers.  
Wage premiums are also associated with employer characteristics. Trotske (1994) uses the 
US Worker-Establishment Characteristics Database which contains linked employer-employee 
data, to study if characteristics of the employer are associated with a wage premium. He finds 
a positive correlation between skills of managers, skills of employees, and the size of the plant, 
but the wage premium disappeared after accounting for capital stock. These findings, obtained 
from standard wage regressions and re-weighting exercises to account for differences in work 
force compositions, are therefore consistent with a production function where labour input is in 
the context of complementary capital.  
A similar observation to the employer-characteristics premium is underlying the search for a 
foreign-ownership premium, studied by Girma and Goerg (2006). They use acquisitions of UK 
firms by foreign companies as a natural experiment to investigate the causal effect of foreign 
ownership on wages of skilled and unskilled workers. To do so, the authors apply difference-in-
difference estimation on a sample generated using PSM from the ONS Annual Respondents 
Database (1980-1994). Assuming that firms do not change in the short run after an acquisition 
all effects on wages are attributed to the change in ownership. The authors find that the effect 
on wages depends on the skill level of employees, industry, and the home country of the 
acquirer (positive effect from acquisition by US company, but none from EU companies). They 
are unable to explain what drives these changes in wages. However, industrial organization 
theory postulates that multinationals are able to pay higher wages because they own firm 
specific assets which increases the marginal productivity of workers. Therefore, this would also 
not comprise a true premium.  
True Pay Premiums 
Gibbons and Katz (1989) note all of these estimations suffer from one flaw, however: they 
assume that compensation for unmeasured ability are uniform across industries. Once this 
assumption is relaxed, it is no longer the case that differencing will be able to account for 
unmeasured ability. Rather, they explain that there will be a matching of workers’ abilities to 
industries, so that a change in employer and the very industry they work for is endogenous. To 
control for this endogeneity, they use the natural experiment of plant closures, so that the 
search for new employment opportunities is no longer endogenous. They also run first-
differences wage regressions to estimate the effect of industry switching on displaced workers’ 
wages. They also determine the effect of the pre-displacement industry on post-displacement 
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earnings. From these regressions, they conclude that unmeasured ability cannot account for 
persistent inter-industry wage differences. Instead, two findings point to the importance of rent 
sharing: the highly negative correlation between wage premiums and quit rates, as well as the 
high correlation of wage differentials between occupations within one industry (e.g. secretaries 
and assembly line workers earning similar premiums despite performing very different tasks).  
In a more recent paper, Abowd et al. (2013) investigate the issue of rent sharing further. They 
explain inter-industry wage differences by decomposing them into employer and employee 
effects. In their model, the differential due to individual heterogeneity depends on workers’ 
opportunity wage rates, and the differential due to employer heterogeneity depends on product 
market quasi-rents (monopoly/ oligopoly rents) and relative bargaining power of workers. The 
employer effect is again disaggregated into pure firm and pure industry effects. Furthermore, 
time-varying covariates are allowed to have an effect on wages. They estimate this model 
using longitudinally linked employer and employee data from the US and France. It turns out 
that quasi-rents per worker account for large proportions of the wage premium. This gives 
further credibility to Gibbons and Katz’ point that wage premiums are real and persistent. 
Another factor that could account for wage premiums are efficiency wages. This theory 
contends that it is efficient to pay workers more than their marginal product to discourage them 
from shirking and reduce employee turnover. The information asymmetry overcome in this way 
increases plant productivity by more than enough to offset higher wage costs. If information 
asymmetries differ across industries, this could explain why some employers choose to pay 
efficiency wages while others stick with lower wage rates. Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) test the 
effect of wage premiums on shirking by exploiting variations in local wage premiums across 
plants. All plants in their sample belonged to the same firm, were covered by the same union 
and collective bargaining arrangements, and workers performed similar jobs. Personnel and 
disciplinary policies were also centrally coordinated. However, based on local labour markets 
(i.e. the wages workers could expect to earn if they were dismissed) wage premiums differed 
across plants. Estimating the effect of the local wage premium on the rate of worker dismissal 
for disciplinary reasons, the authors find a negative effect of the premium on shirking. Hence, 
efficiency wages seem to be able to overcome information asymmetries and induce workers to 
exert more effort. However, the authors stress that they did not attempt to estimate the actual 
efficiency of the wages, i.e. whether the pay premiums paid for themselves through higher 
productivity.
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The main source of data used in the approach to estimate wage premiums is the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). This is the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) principal 
source for earnings estimates, collected in April of each year, and uses data on 181,000 
employees, of which about 120,000 are full-time. To estimate the wage premium, there were 
three methodological steps: 
• Businesses in defence were identified (chapter 3 describes this) and matched to surveys 
in the ONS Virtual Microdata Lab, primarily ASHE 
• Each job in ASHE was linked using occupational classification to skills and experience 
variables 
• Regression methods were used on the dataset to estimate wage premiums. 
This annex describes the data for skills/experience. It then presents the detail of the 
estimation. 
Skills in Defence and non-Defence Jobs 
ASHE provides the wage rate, hours worked and other characteristics for a large sample of 
jobs. There are other factors which should be considered when estimating a possible wage 
premium in the defence sector: skill level of employees, specific activities performed on the job 
and knowledge required for the job. For example, it is possible that employers in the defence 
industry seek employees who have a higher level of skills that are in short supply, or specific 
activities and/or knowledge which may be scarce. A shortage of specific skills or knowledge 
could be putting an upward pressure on wages.  
Skills by Occupations 
The main variable in ASHE that defines the type of job is occupation, using standard 
occupational classification revision 2010. This coding can then be linked to the US-based 
Occupational Information Network’s (O*NET) comprehensive source of information on skills, 
activities and knowledge for occupations. The O*NET database provides information on the 
required skills using around 250 measures of skills, abilities, work activities, training, work 
context and job characteristics for each of around 1,000 different US occupations (based on a 
modified version of the US Standard Occupational Classification). The data is gathered from 
employers and employees through standardised survey questionnaires and is further assessed 
by professional job analysts. A first step to making the dataset usable in this project was to 
match O*NET SOC codes to UK SOC codes. In a second step, variables are condensed into 
factors to make them usable in regression analysis. 
Recently, the O*NET system has updated its US SOC classification to a new O*NET-
SOC2010 version. The O*NET-SOC taxonomy is now aligned with the US standard 
occupational classification, 2010 revision. As a result, there is potentially new data, including 
skills and abilities, which can be matched. The information is available for both the levels of 
skills or abilities required and the importance of these skills/abilities for the occupation 
concerned. 
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During the present analysis, it became apparent that there was considerable difficulty in getting 
unambiguous, one-to-one matches between O*NET and UK occupations. Direct matching of 
O*NET SOC to UK SOC was not possible. Instead, the approach was to first match the O*NET 
SOC codes to the international SOC (ISCO) codes, using look-up files provided by O*NET and 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and then manually match the UK SOC codes to 
international SOC codes. As there are more occupational titles in the O*NET database than in 
the UK SOC, some UK occupations are mapped to more than one equivalent US occupation. 
In some cases, however, there are direct single matches. Also, it should be noted that the look-
up file (matching ISCO codes to UK SOC) contains 145 ISCO codes that were not matched to 
the UK SOC. 
O*NET data is very rich for different occupations: it defines 30-40 skills, activities and 
knowledge for each occupation, in terms of the level needed and its importance. For example, 
for a secretary, basic IT skills are very important, but the level required is only intermediate, 
whereas for a web designer, both level and importance are high. The quantification is based on 
survey results about the percentage of employees in a given occupation who have a given 
level of experience, education or training. For example, the value for “education – level 6” for 
electrical engineers is 70, meaning 70% of electrical engineers require a bachelor’s degree. 
Because of the large number of skills, activities and knowledge variables available in O*NET it 
is difficult to conduct a meaningful analysis without first reducing these variables to a smaller 
number. Hence, factor analysis was used to reduce variables to several meaningful factors. 
The factor analysis assigns to each variable a factor loading, indicating its importance for a 
certain factor variable. The values for different SOC codes are generated by multiplying the 
value for each variable by its factor loading and summing up across variables. Because factor 
loadings can be negative, some SOC codes have negative scores for some factor variables. 
Factor analysis aggregates and normalises the data, reducing the data to a more manageable 
size by combining variables that are highly correlated. This distils the rich O*NET data into an 
alternative summary of skills, activities and knowledge by nineteen factors, extracted from the 
results of the principal component analysis. A key advantage is also that the resulting factors 
are rendered orthogonal, such that any problems of multicollinearity between the skills 
variables, if they were used as individual regression inputs, is overcome. 
To test the validity of the analysis, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was conducted. In this case, the 
values allowed the null hypothesis that these variables are not correlated with the population to 
be rejected, confirming the validity of the principal component analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s 
(KMO) test on sampling adequacy, measuring the proportion of variance among variables that 
may be common variance. 
In the final stage, the resulting components were identified by examining the scree plot and 
using the Kaiser’s criterion of adopting all factors with Eigen value greater than 1. However, it 
should be noted that the original solution for skills and activities variables was 7 and 6 factors 
respectively. These variables were reduced to 5 factors each after qualitative inspection of the 
data to provide more meaningful results. Overall, in distilling the O*NET data into 19 variables, 
over 80% of the total variance for skills, activities and knowledge was retained. 
Shortage Occupations 
The 2015 Employer Skills Survey was used for this research to provide a range of variables 
about the shortages employers had observed in certain occupations. The survey asks 91,000 
employers about their vacancies and their experience with difficulties of filling these. 
Respondents are asked to list some typical jobs they have run recruitments for, whether they 
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proved hard to fill and – if so – what reasons explained their recruitment problems. Each role 
that the survey covers is coded to a SOC.  
The survey goes beyond skills shortages, asking about business strategies to meet skills gaps 
such as training plans. However, for this study, the ability to link occupations with evidence 
about skills shortages was the focus. A range of variables were generated detailing whether 
occupations exhibited shortages (the proportion of responses that answered there was 
difficulty in filling a vacancy) and then simple averages about the reasons for failure to fill. 
Location of Defence Jobs 
ASHE provides the postcode of each job, reflecting the address of the plant at which an 
employee works. This becomes a very useful variable, with many defence jobs being in 
businesses that have multiple plants. The ASHE evidence helps to identify both where the job 
is and, when linked to other data, specific detail about the type of role within defence that the 
job is associated with. 
BIS provided the study with lists of major defence locations, including the name of the 
company or companies that worked in the locations. The team then reviewed public 
documents to characterise each location. For major defence projects, this information reveals 
whether the location is likely to be associated with maritime defence expenditure, procurement 
that is related to the land environment, or aviation related. A cautious approach to this geo-
coding was needed – for example London was ignored given the density of jobs in the capital 
precludes accuracy. 
Estimating the Wage premium using Regression 
The most straightforward analysis of a defence premium is to run a regression of the (log) 
gross pay, w, for all jobs on the characteristics of the job, X, and with a dummy variable to 
identify those in defence. 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 B1 
Table B1 presents the results for 2012-4 for four models. The first two models use a definition 
of defence jobs that is relatively wide, in that these are suppliers to MOD and businesses that 
are members of one of the other defence lists. The definition excludes businesses where the 
sales to MOD were known to be a small portion of total sales. It defines about a thousand jobs 
as defence. In this definition, the sample of businesses that are located in maritime and 
aviation centres of employment is sufficiently large to allow a dummy for each of these to be 
included. 
The defence premium is about 10%. This is after controlling for various indicators of firm size, 
the location of the job and the four-year average of capital expenditure per employee. As well 
as skills proxies, the estimation includes measures of occupational skills shortages, taken from 
the Employer Skills Survey. The regression fit is high and the explanatory power of the controls 
is – as expected – strong. 
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Table B1.1: Wage premium regression results for 2012 
Log gross pay Defence businesses Restricted defence businesses 
 ß SE ß SE ß SE ß SE 
Defence businesses (dummy) 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.02 
Maritime defence businesses 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07     
Aviation defence businesses 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06     
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00 
Capital exp (£’00/employee) 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00  0.00 
Employment -0.08 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 0.00  0.00 
Size 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.00 
London 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.00  0.00 
Southeast 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00  0.00 
Constant 6.07 0.01 5.71 0.01 6.07 0.01  0.01 
Skills proxies Occupation O*NET Occupation O*NET 
Number of obs 109638 102382 109638 102382 
Adj-R2 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.45 
 
 
Table B1.2: Wage premium regression results for 2013 
Log gross pay Defence businesses Restricted defence businesses 
 ß SE ß SE ß SE ß SE 
Defence businesses (dummy) 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Maritime defence businesses 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04     
Aviation defence businesses 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06     
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Capital exp (£’00/employee) 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 2.34 0.09 0.06 0.00 
Employment -0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 0.00 
Size 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
London 0.26 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.26 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Southeast 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.27 0.00 
Constant 6.08 0.01 5.72 0.01 6.07 0.01 5.72 0.01 
Skills proxies Occupation O*NET Occupation O*NET 
Number of obs 111509 104051 111509 104051 
Adj-R2 0.41 0.46 0.41 0.46 
 
In the modelling, two skills proxies are used. The first is relatively crude, using 1-digit 
occupational code dummies. It is noticeable that when the O*NET factors are used, improving 
the skills profiling for each job, the defence premium remains similar but lower. 
  
51 
Annex B: Estimating the Wage Premium 
The estimations presented extract the wage premium but this can be further disaggregated. To 
achieve this disaggregation, equation B1 is compare to a model which uses interaction terms, 
equation B2, on the characteristics variable. 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾′+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  B2 
 
Table B1.3: Wage premium regression results for 2014 
Log gross pay Defence businesses Restricted defence businesses 
 ß SE ß SE ß SE ß SE 
Defence businesses (dummy) 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.02 
Maritime defence businesses 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05     
Aviation defence businesses 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.04     
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Capital exp (£’00/employee) 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Employment -0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.00 
Size 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
London 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Southeast 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Constant 6.07 0.01 5.71 0.01 6.07 0.01 5.71 0.01 
Skills proxies Occupation O*NET Occupation O*NET 
Number of obs 114195 106609 114195 106609 
Adj-R2 0.41 0.46 0.41 0.46 
 
Wage Premium in Matched Jobs 
To select comparable jobs in the non-defence businesses, propensity score matching (PSM) is 
used (BIS, 2016 for a full description). A first step is to model the likelihood of a job being in a 
defence firm, estimating the chance of this using a probit model. The modelling provides a 
measure called the propensity score, which is used to construct the matched group. A job is 
selected from the non-defence jobs that has a propensity score closest to each of the jobs in 
defence businesses (i.e. on the basis of all observed characteristics). “Matching with 
replacement” is used, meaning that a non-defence job from the wider ASHE pool can be the 
“nearest neighbour” match for multiple treated businesses (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
There are two key assumptions must hold: the conditional independence assumption and the 
common support assumption. Conditional independence means that there are no 
unobservable differences between the defence and non-defence jobs after conditioning for the 
characteristics of each job, so that any systematic differences in wage levels can be attributed 
to the sector (Imbens 2004, Smith and Todd 2005). The common support assumption requires 
an overlap in the distribution of covariates between the defence jobs and the non-defence jobs 
to make matching possible. If this is not the case, then some part of the defence jobs are 
unique and no match can occur. 
The modelling of the propensity score uses a probit model. This is presented in table B2 and 
indicates that the modelling of defence jobs can identify likelihood quite well. The pseudo R-
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squared measures the quality of the fits and, at around 0.27, indicates the modelling explains 
the data reasonably well. A job in defence tends to be held by an older individual, who is male 
and the employer is likely to be in manufacturing, with the plants being large and located in the 
Southeast but not in London. The table does not include the various variables for skills used to 
model whether a job is in defence. However, results are consistent with other findings, that 
defence jobs are generally highly skilled. 
Once a comparable set of businesses has been constructed, it is straightforward to calculated 
the average pay for each group and to test whether any difference is significant. The modelling 
was run for each of the years 2012-4 and table 5.1 provides the results. Analyses was also 
conducted matching the jobs located in centres of maritime and aviation employment. 
Table B2: Probit model for selection into defence 
 2012 2013 2014 
 ß Z-score ß Z-score ß Z-score 
Age 0.00 2.93 0.00 3.53 0.01 4.84 
Gender -0.13 -2.92 -0.13 -3.18 -0.16 -3.71 
Total hours -0.01 -2.00 -0.02 -5.27 -0.01 -2.95 
Capital exp (£’00/employee) 0.00 -2.99 -0.01 -4.21 -0.01 -4.30 
Manufacturing (=1) 0.87 21.97 0.15 1.75 0.45 3.26 
Private sector (=1) 1.32 8.32 0.86 23.15 0.77 21.16 
Employment (’00,000) 0.00 -6.83 1.15 10.27 1.12 10.51 
Log Employment 0.20 11.51 0.00 -8.11 0.00 -9.50 
Size (Large =1) -0.42 -6.77 0.19 11.12 0.21 11.77 
London -0.23 -3.18 -0.27 -4.51 -0.22 -3.95 
Southeast 0.36 8.43 -0.25 -3.73 -0.25 -3.79 
Shortage occupation (=1) -0.04 -0.34 0.29 6.90 0.25 5.92 
Constant -5.03 -21.03 -4.32 -19.46 -4.77 -23.50 
Skills proxies O*NET and ESS O*NET and ESS O*NET and ESS 
Number of obs 102382  104051  106609  
Log likelihood -2953.6  -3296.0  -3404.0  
Pseudo R2 0.27  0.27  0.26  
 
Balance Tests after Propensity Score Matching 
It is important to check the matching quality. Checks firstly look at the average characteristics 
of the defence jobs and the selected comparable jobs. Table B3 presents results for 2012-4. 
For 2012, it shows that, while employment was significantly lower in the unmatched ASHE 
population of 102,379 jobs, the 666 jobs that were matched to the defence jobs had an 
insignificant difference. There are statistical tests to confirm the two groups are similar. The 
attention then turns to whether individual jobs are matched to appropriate non-defence jobs in 
terms of the propensity score. A focus is whether there is an overlap or ‘common support’ 
region. The intuition behind common support is that jobs with the same characteristics should 
have a positive probability of being both a defence job and a non-defence one. The matching is 
considered unsuccessful if this is not the case (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999).
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Table B3: PS-tests on matching balance 
    2012 2013 2014 
    Means of samples Bias in 
matched 
sample 
(%) 
Means of samples Bias in 
matched 
sample 
(%) 
Means of samples Bias in 
matched 
sample 
(%) 
Category Variable 
Defence 
Jobs 
Non-
Defence 
Jobs 
Matched  
Jobs 
Defence 
Jobs 
Non-
Defence 
Jobs 
Matched  
Jobs 
Defence 
Jobs 
Non-
Defence 
Jobs 
Matched  
Jobs 
Person Age 43.44 40.74 43.61 -1.50 43.75 40.83 43.12 5.30 44.04 40.76 44.34 -2.50 
  Sex 0.18 0.42 0.20 -2.70 0.19 0.42 0.21 -5.30 0.18 0.43 0.17 2.60 
  Total hours worked 39.46 39.03 39.36 1.60 38.81 39.02 38.57 4.80 39.31 39.15 39.25 0.90 
Firm Capex past three years 6.45 3.61 6.64 -0.80 6.07 3.26 6.30 -1.90 5.59 3.14 5.47 1.10 
  Manufacturing (=1) 0.67 0.11 0.66 3.00 0.67 0.12 0.65 4.30 0.64 0.11 0.66 -6.00 
  Private sector (=1) 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.69 0.99 1.60 0.99 0.72 0.98 2.40 
  Employment 5779.20 15593.00 4851.40 3.3* 5318.20 15160.00 4114.40 4.3** 4335.30 14196.00 4006.20 1.20 
  Log Employment 7.11 7.05 6.89 8.60 7.17 7.03 6.93 9.5* 7.08 6.96 6.95 5.50 
  Large business (=1) 0.58 0.61 0.54 -4.50 0.63 0.61 0.59 -4.00 0.64 0.61 0.63 -5.60 
  London (=1) 0.04 0.17 0.06 -4.50 0.04 0.17 0.05 -4.00 0.05 0.17 0.06 -5.60 
  Southeast (=1) 0.27 0.14 0.30 -5.60 0.24 0.14 0.27 -6.80 0.22 0.14 0.24 -5.40 
Occupation Shortage occupation (=1) 0.47 0.39 0.46 4.70 0.47 0.39 0.49 -5.90 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.40 
  Hard-to-fill occupation (=1) 1.94 1.26 1.52 9.90 1.91 1.27 2.06 -3.60 1.90 1.25 1.75 3.80 
Skills People, Systems and Operations -0.04 0.15 -0.06 2.00 0.00 0.15 -0.04 3.90 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.40 
  Materials, Equipment & Technical 0.38 -0.21 0.35 3.20 0.37 -0.21 0.34 2.80 0.39 -0.21 0.40 -1.10 
  Programming and equipment 0.83 -0.03 0.99 -13.7* 0.86 -0.02 0.97 -8.90 0.84 -0.03 0.89 -3.90 
  Coordination and Persuasion 0.25 0.06 0.27 -2.10 0.30 0.06 0.25 5.50 0.30 0.06 0.31 -1.70 
  Active learning skills 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Activities People, Systems and Operations 0.03 0.00 0.08 -4.10 0.10 0.00 0.08 2.10 0.12 -0.01 0.15 -2.70 
  Materials, Equipment & Technical 0.58 0.16 0.63 -6.00 0.59 0.16 0.59 -0.60 0.58 0.15 0.57 0.10 
  Programming and equipment 0.18 -0.20 0.11 6.90 0.17 -0.20 0.14 2.90 0.18 -0.20 0.14 4.00 
  Coordination and Persuasion -0.56 0.16 -0.66 10.50 -0.60 0.16 -0.67 6.80 -0.60 0.17 -0.67 7.50 
  Active learning skills -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -3.20 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -2.70 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 1.00 
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Table B3: PS-tests on matching balance (cont.) 
    2012 2013 2014 
    Means of samples Bias in 
matched 
sample 
(%) 
Means of samples Bias in 
matched 
sample 
(%) 
Means of samples Bias in 
matched 
sample 
(%) 
Category Variable 
Defence 
Jobs 
Non-
Defence 
Jobs 
Matched  
Jobs 
Defence 
Jobs 
Non-
Defence 
Jobs 
Matched  
Jobs 
Defence 
Jobs 
Non-
Defence 
Jobs 
Matched  
Jobs 
Knowledge Humanities, Law, Education and  
Chemistry -0.15 0.06 -0.19 5.40 -0.11 0.06 -0.09 -1.80 -0.11 0.05 -0.14 4.10 
  
Science, Econ, Computer, 
Languages,  Arts & Geography 0.70 -0.10 0.70 -0.40 0.76 -0.10 0.79 -2.60 0.75 -0.11 0.75 -0.30 
  
Engineering, Education, Public safety,  
Food production 0.10 0.18 0.15 -4.70 0.16 0.18 0.13 3.70 0.17 0.16 0.21 -3.50 
  
Telecom, Mechanical, Personnel and  
human resources 0.58 0.13 0.70 -11.90 0.57 0.13 0.60 -3.10 0.53 0.12 0.55 -2.40 
  
Transportation, Philosophy and 
Theology -0.19 -0.04 -0.26 6.80 -0.21 -0.05 -0.24 2.60 -0.21 -0.04 -0.26 5.90 
  
Psychology, Biology, Sociology and  
Anthropology -0.26 -0.07 -0.27 0.50 -0.24 -0.07 -0.23 -0.90 -0.24 -0.08 -0.24 0.00 
  Clerical, Therapy and counselling -0.16 -0.08 -0.13 -2.90 -0.13 -0.07 -0.11 -1.80 -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -3.40 
  Mathematics knowledge -0.29 -0.17 -0.21 -9.90 -0.29 -0.17 -0.25 -5.90 -0.30 -0.17 -0.33 4.20 
  Physics knowledge -0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
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Sensitivity Tests 
The analysis may be biased if there are unobservable variables that drive selection into the 
defence sector, as well as the outcome in terms of any pay premium. One approach to test for 
the potential impact of unobserved variables is the Rosenbaum-bounds method. It assesses 
“how strongly an unmeasured confounding variable must affect selection into treatment in 
order to undermine the conclusions about causal effects from matching analysis” (DiPrete and 
Gangl, 2004). Different levels of hidden bias can be expressed in terms of the odds ratio, 
gamma (Γ), of two matched observations being treated. If matching is unbiased, observations 
with the same observable characteristics have the same probability of being treated. When 
Γ=2, an unmeasured confounding variable causes one observation to be twice as likely to be 
selected into treatment as the matched observation with the same observable characteristics 
(Peel and Makepeace, 2009).  
The method then does the following. It assumes that there is a known factor causing bias to 
the level of Γ, and that the treatment effect from this bias can be stripped out. Once this is 
done, it is tested whether the treatment effect remains significant. In this fashion, starting with 
zero bias, the treatment effect can be computed and the assumption of ever larger bias tested. 
The panels of Table B4 give the Rosenbaum bounds estimation for different matching models 
used in this study. For different levels of Γ, it gives the upper and lower point estimates of the 
treatment effects, under the assumption of negative and positive selection bias, respectively. It 
also gives significance levels for these estimates under the null-hypothesis that the true 
treatment effect is zero at a certain level of positive or negative bias. The upper and lower point 
estimates can be interpreted in terms of a – usually – increasing cone of possible values as Γ 
rises. Where the cone begins to include zero, this is the level of bias where results are no 
longer robust. 
The results for each year about the defence jobs indicate the level of bias would have to quite 
high before the estimated wage premium, used as the outcome variable, would be significantly 
different from that estimated were no bias assumed. This suggests the results are robust. The 
results for the aviation and maritime sample of defence jobs are less clear cut. At modest 
levels of bias, the PSM matches would give different results about wage premiums between 
the identified defence jobs and the wider set of jobs.  
Apart from the underlying matching being problematic, there is another explanation for this: the 
sample size in these groups becomes quite small. The problem is that the wage premium 
estimates may not be very robust
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Table B4.1: Rosenbaum bounds test for 2012 
  All Defence Jobs Sectoral defence jobs 
  Wider definition of defence Narrow definition of defence Maritime Combat Air 
  
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Γ Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower 
1.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14 -0.11 -0.11 0.42 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 
1.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 0.39 0.44 -0.01 -0.01 
1.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.16 -0.12 -0.10 0.37 0.46 -0.02 -0.01 
1.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.17 -0.12 -0.10 0.35 0.48 -0.02 0.00 
1.08 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.18 -0.13 -0.10 0.33 0.50 -0.02 0.00 
1.10 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.19 -0.13 -0.10 0.31 0.53 -0.03 0.00 
1.12 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.19 -0.13 -0.10 0.30 0.55 -0.03 0.01 
1.14 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.20 -0.13 -0.10 0.28 0.57 -0.04 0.01 
1.16 0.32 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.21 -0.13 -0.09 0.26 0.59 -0.04 0.01 
1.18 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.22 -0.13 -0.09 0.25 0.61 -0.05 0.02 
1.20 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.08 0.23 -0.14 -0.09 0.23 0.62 -0.05 0.02 
1.30 0.79 0.00 -0.02 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.27 -0.15 -0.08 0.17 0.71 -0.07 0.05 
1.40 0.95 0.00 -0.04 0.14 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.32 -0.16 -0.07 0.12 0.78 -0.08 0.07 
1.50 0.99 0.00 -0.06 0.16 0.72 0.00 -0.02 0.21 0.03 0.36 -0.16 -0.06 0.08 0.83 -0.10 0.08 
 
Table B4.2: Rosenbaum bounds test for 2013 
  All Defence Jobs Sectoral defence jobs 
  Wider definition of defence Narrow definition of defence Maritime Combat Air 
  
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Γ Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower 
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.31 0.31 0.03 0.03 
1.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.33 0.29 0.03 0.04 
1.04 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.19 0.36 0.27 0.02 0.04 
1.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.38 0.25 0.02 0.05 
1.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.02 0.05 
1.10 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.42 0.22 0.02 0.05 
1.12 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.44 0.20 0.01 0.06 
1.14 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.46 0.19 0.01 0.06 
1.16 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.48 0.18 0.00 0.06 
1.18 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.07 
1.20 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.24 0.52 0.15 -0.01 0.08 
1.30 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.29 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.62 0.10 -0.02 0.10 
1.40 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.28 0.70 0.07 -0.04 0.12 
1.50 0.67 0.00 -0.01 0.22 0.78 0.00 -0.02 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.30 0.76 0.04 -0.05 0.13 
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Table B4.3: Rosenbaum bounds test for 2014 
  All Defence Jobs Sectoral defence jobs 
  Wider definition of defence Narrow definition of defence Maritime Combat Air 
  
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Significance of 
selection effect Point estimate 
Γ Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower Positive Negative Upper Lower 
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 
1.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.19 
1.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.20 
1.06 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.20 
1.08 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.21 
1.10 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.21 
1.12 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.21 
1.14 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.22 
1.16 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.22 
1.18 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.23 
1.20 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.23 
1.30 0.67 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.26 
1.40 0.91 0.00 -0.03 0.16 0.41 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.27 
1.50 0.98 0.00 -0.05 0.18 0.67 0.00 -0.01 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.29 
 
  
58 
Annex C: Additional Tables 
Annex C: Additional Tables 
In the report, tables often focus on particular years. This annex gives a complete set of results 
for the three years of ASHE used: 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
Summary Statistics, 2012-14 
Table C1.1: Summary statistics, 2012 
  
  All businesses Defence businesses 
Variables Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
Gross pay Log 6.219 0.509 117012 6.460 
Age Year 40.9 11.9 117039 43.18 
Gender (female=1) Proportion 0.41 0.49 117039 0.18 
Total hours Hours per week 39.06 5.93 117039 39.46 
Average capital expenditure, all assets 3-yr log average 3.89 40.52 116944 6.45 
Defence businesses (=1) Proportion 0.007 0.084 117039 1.00 
Manufacturing (=1) Proportion 0.119 0.323 108997 0.67 
Defence prime (=1) Proportion 0.002 0.046 117039 0.30 
Shortage occupation (=1) Proportion 0.39 0.24 109760 0.45 
Private sector (=1) Proportion 0.68 0.47 117039 1.00 
Employment Jobs 15351 38245 117030 5732 
Log Employment Log 7.08 2.84 116935 7.10 
Size (Large=1) Proportion 0.62 0.49 117039 0.58 
London Proportion 0.16 0.37 117039 0.04 
Southeast Proportion 0.13 0.34 117039 0.27 
Skills Factor Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
People, Systems and Operations Factor score 0.175 0.971 108997 0.01 
Materials, Equipment & Technical Factor score -0.186 0.973 108997 0.44 
Programming and equipment Factor score -0.030 0.910 108997 0.75 
Coordination and Persuasion Factor score 0.064 1.066 108997 0.23 
Active learning skills Factor score 0.054 0.933 108997 0.34 
Analysing, processing information, consulting, advising Factor score 0.016 1.106 108997 0.06 
Problem solving, negotiating, control, planning & 
prioritising Factor score 0.172 0.783 108997 0.55 
Handling, inspecting objects, machines and vehicles, 
coordinating people Factor score -0.168 0.950 108997 0.25 
Monitoring processes, materials and surroundings and 
selling and influencing Factor score 0.177 0.986 108997 -0.51 
Coaching people, inspecting equipment & structures and 
selling & influencing Factor score -0.067 1.063 108997 0.00 
Humanities, Law, Education and Chemistry Factor score 0.088 1.069 108997 -0.13 
Science, Econ, Computer, Languages, Arts & Geography Factor score -0.094 0.980 108997 0.69 
Engineering, Education, Public safety, Food production Factor score 0.162 1.087 108997 0.08 
Telecom, Mechanical, Personnel and human resources Factor score 0.151 0.873 108997 0.55 
Transportation, Philosophy and Theology Factor score 0.000 0.928 108997 -0.13 
Psychology, Biology, Sociology and Anthropology Factor score -0.073 0.956 108997 -0.29 
Clerical, Therapy and counselling Factor score -0.087 0.929 108997 -0.18 
Mathematics knowledge Factor score -0.191 0.914 108997 -0.28 
Physics knowledge Factor score -0.007 0.939 108997 -0.08 
  
59 
Annex C: Additional Tables 
Table C1.2: Summary statistics, 2013 
  
  All businesses Defence businesses 
Variables Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
Gross pay Log 6.233 0.509 118908 6.480 
Age Year 41.0 11.9 118932 43.29 
Gender (female=1) Proportion 0.41 0.49 118932 0.17 
Total hours Hours per week 39.05 5.79 118932 38.81 
Average capital expenditure, all assets 3-yr log average 3.44 19.02 118880 6.07 
Defence businesses (=1) Proportion 0.008 0.089 118932 1.00 
Manufacturing (=1) Proportion 0.121 0.326 110709 0.66 
Defence prime (=1) Proportion 0.002 0.050 118932 0.31 
Shortage occupation (=1) Proportion 0.39 0.24 111589 0.44 
Private sector (=1) Proportion 0.69 0.46 118932 0.99 
Employment Jobs 14878 38001 118912 5318 
Log Employment Log 7.07 2.81 118865 7.17 
Size (Large=1) Proportion 0.62 0.48 118932 0.63 
London Proportion 0.16 0.37 118932 0.05 
Southeast Proportion 0.13 0.34 118932 0.20 
Skills Factor Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
People, Systems and Operations Factor score 0.172 0.974 110709 0.07 
Materials, Equipment & Technical Factor score -0.187 0.976 110709 0.46 
Programming and equipment Factor score -0.023 0.920 110709 0.74 
Coordination and Persuasion Factor score 0.062 1.068 110709 0.27 
Active learning skills Factor score 0.055 0.934 110709 0.39 
Analysing, processing information, consulting, advising Factor score 0.015 1.105 110709 0.14 
Problem solving, negotiating, control, planning & 
prioritising Factor score 0.173 0.785 110709 0.54 
Handling, inspecting objects, machines and vehicles, 
coordinating people Factor score -0.171 0.951 110709 0.27 
Monitoring processes, materials and surroundings and 
selling and influencing Factor score 0.176 0.992 110709 -0.53 
Coaching people, inspecting equipment & structures and 
selling & influencing Factor score -0.071 1.067 110709 0.01 
Humanities, Law, Education and Chemistry Factor score 0.093 1.070 110709 -0.09 
Science, Econ, Computer, Languages, Arts & 
Geography Factor score -0.094 0.982 110709 0.75 
Engineering, Education, Public safety, Food production Factor score 0.160 1.086 110709 0.14 
Telecom, Mechanical, Personnel and human resources Factor score 0.148 0.871 110709 0.53 
Transportation, Philosophy and Theology Factor score -0.009 0.924 110709 -0.09 
Psychology, Biology, Sociology and Anthropology Factor score -0.075 0.953 110709 -0.28 
Clerical, Therapy and counselling Factor score -0.079 0.933 110709 -0.17 
Mathematics knowledge Factor score -0.190 0.912 110709 -0.30 
Physics knowledge Factor score -0.002 0.946 110709 -0.06 
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Table C1.3: Summary statistics, 2014 
  
  All businesses Defence businesses 
Variables Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
Gross pay Log 6.235 0.511 121540 6.505 
Age Year 40.9 12.1 121573 43.63 
Gender (female=1) Proportion 0.41 0.49 121573 0.17 
Total hours Hours per week 39.17 6.52 121573 39.31 
Average capital expenditure, all assets 3-yr log average 3.29 22.83 121508 5.59 
Defence businesses (=1) Proportion 0.008 0.089 121573 1.00 
Manufacturing (=1) Proportion 0.119 0.323 113298 0.64 
Defence prime (=1) Proportion 0.002 0.048 121573 0.29 
Shortage occupation (=1) Proportion 0.39 0.24 114298 0.44 
Private sector (=1) Proportion 0.71 0.46 121573 0.99 
Employment Jobs 13968 36247 121545 4335 
Log Employment Log 7.00 2.81 121495 7.08 
Size (Large=1) Proportion 0.61 0.49 121573 0.64 
London Proportion 0.16 0.37 121573 0.05 
Southeast Proportion 0.14 0.34 121573 0.22 
Skills Factor Unit Mean s.d. Observations Mean 
People, Systems and Operations Factor score 0.155 0.974 113298 0.07 
Materials, Equipment & Technical Factor score -0.186 0.975 113298 0.48 
Programming and equipment Factor score -0.033 0.922 113298 0.72 
Coordination and Persuasion Factor score 0.057 1.057 113298 0.27 
Active learning skills Factor score 0.056 0.931 113298 0.40 
Analysing, processing information, consulting, advising Factor score 0.006 1.096 113298 0.15 
Problem solving, negotiating, control, planning & 
prioritising Factor score 0.160 0.789 113298 0.53 
Handling, inspecting objects, machines and vehicles, 
coordinating people Factor score -0.167 0.952 113298 0.29 
Monitoring processes, materials and surroundings and 
selling and influencing Factor score 0.177 0.989 113298 -0.52 
Coaching people, inspecting equipment & structures and 
selling & influencing Factor score -0.073 1.068 113298 -0.01 
Humanities, Law, Education and Chemistry Factor score 0.081 1.066 113298 -0.08 
Science, Econ, Computer, Languages, Arts & 
Geography Factor score -0.100 0.979 113298 0.75 
Engineering, Education, Public safety, Food production Factor score 0.146 1.082 113298 0.15 
Telecom, Mechanical, Personnel and human resources Factor score 0.136 0.875 113298 0.49 
Transportation, Philosophy and Theology Factor score -0.005 0.924 113298 -0.10 
Psychology, Biology, Sociology and Anthropology Factor score -0.081 0.949 113298 -0.27 
Clerical, Therapy and counselling Factor score -0.075 0.929 113298 -0.17 
Mathematics knowledge Factor score -0.184 0.910 113298 -0.30 
Physics knowledge Factor score -0.006 0.950 113298 -0.06 
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Annex C: Additional Tables 
Weekly Pay for Defence and all Jobs, 2013-14 
Table C2.1: Defence and non-Defence Weekly Pay Averages for 2013 
    Different pay measures drawing from ASHE 
  Number of jobs 
Weekly 
hours Gross Pay Basic Pay 
Gross excl 
Overtime 
Defence jobs 957 38.9 £718.35 £641.78 £687.23 
Maritime jobs 83 39.9 £730.90 £599.27 £674.71 
Aviation jobs 111 37.9 £730.40 £586.12 £681.42 
ALL JOBS 118912 39.1 £590.25 £545.64 £573.75 
 
Table C2.2: Defence and non-Defence Weekly Pay Averages for 2014 
    Different pay measures drawing from ASHE 
  Number of jobs 
Weekly 
hours Gross Pay Basic Pay 
Gross excl 
Overtime 
Defence jobs 960 39.3 £732.77 £659.71 £699.03 
Maritime jobs 84 40.5 £756.78 £611.49 £692.64 
Aviation jobs 136 38.6 £835.23 £719.36 £798.41 
ALL JOBS 121573 39.2 £591.46 £548.40 £574.88 
 
Defence Jobs by Region, 2013-14 
Table C3: ASHE Full-Time Defence and non-Defence Jobs by Region, 2013-14 
GOR Description 
2013 2014 
All jobs Defence jobs All jobs 
Defence 
jobs 
1 North East 4,777 16 4,882 25 
2 North West 13,267 144 13,427 153 
3 Yorkshire and The Humber 9,760 24 9,875 22 
4 East Midlands 8,716 42 8,824 76 
5 West Midlands 10,508 72 10,809 58 
6 South West 9,595 140 9,784 140 
7 East 10,679 83 10,965 72 
8 London 19,307 37 19,889 44 
9 South East 15,935 218 16,442 203 
10 Wales 5,431 72 5,573 69 
11 Scotland 10,957 109 11,103 98 
TOTAL 118,932 957 121,573 960 
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Annex C: Additional Tables 
Jobs by Occupation, 2013-14 
Table C4.1: ASHE Full-Time Defence and non-Defence Jobs by Occupation, 2013 
SOC Description Defence 
Of which: 
All jobs Defence jobs Marine Air 
11 Corporate Managers And Directors 84 ** 15       6,993  1.2% 
21 Science, Research, Engineering And Technology Professionals 204 10 10       5,673  3.6% 
24 Business, Media And Public Service 
Professionals 
38 ** **       5,040  0.8% 
25 20 ** **       1,177  1.7% 
31 Science, Eng'ing & Tech Ass Prof'nals 75 ** **       3,501  2.1% 
35 Business And Public Service Associate 
Professionals 
68 ** **       8,093  0.8% 
36 12 0 **       2,269  0.5% 
41 Administrative Occupations 41 ** **       7,653  0.5% 
42 Secretarial And Related Occupations 53 ** **       8,517  0.6% 
52 Skilled Metal, Elec'l/Electronic Trades 159 34 37       5,125  3.1% 
53 Skilled Construction & Building Trades 14 ** **       1,937  0.7% 
81 Process, Plant & Machine Operatives 72 10 **       4,921  1.5% 
82 Transport Drivers And Operatives 24 0 **       4,595  0.5% 
91 Elementary Trades, Administration, Service 
And Related Occupations 
13 ** **       2,438  0.5% 
93 29 0 **       6,091  0.5% 
All All Occupations 957 83 111   118,932  0.8% 
 
Table C4.2: ASHE Full-Time Defence and non-Defence Jobs by Occupation, 2014 
SOC Description Defence 
Of which: 
All jobs Defence jobs Marine Air 
11 Corporate Managers And Directors 82 12 16       6,988  1.2% 
21 Science, Research, Engineering And Technology Professionals 197 ** 30       5,778  3.4% 
24 Business, Media And Public Service 
Professionals 
39 ** **       5,206  0.7% 
25 21 ** **       1,240  1.7% 
31 Science, Eng'ing & Tech Ass Prof'nals 77 ** **       3,493  2.2% 
35 Business And Public Service Associate 
Professionals 
66 ** **       8,297  0.8% 
36 15 ** **       2,283  0.7% 
41 Administrative Occupations 36 ** **       7,317  0.5% 
42 Secretarial And Related Occupations 47 ** **       8,835  0.5% 
52 Skilled Metal, Elec'l/Electronic Trades 159 25 42       5,202  3.1% 
53 Skilled Construction & Building Trades 14 ** **       1,901  0.7% 
81 Process, Plant & Machine Operatives 78 ** **       4,880  1.6% 
82 Transport Drivers And Operatives 23 0 **       4,779  0.5% 
91 Elementary Trades, Administration, Service 
And Related Occupations 
17 ** 0       2,593  0.7% 
93 37 ** **       7,011  0.5% 
All All Occupations 960 84 136   121,573  0.8% 
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